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ABSTRACT—Despite the increasing importance attached to the right of 
publicity, its doctrinal scope has yet to be clearly articulated. The right of 
publicity supposedly allows a cause of action for the commercial 
exploitation of a person’s name, voice, or image. The inconvenient reality, 
however, is that only a tiny fraction of such instances are truly actionable. 
This Article tackles the mismatch between the blackletter doctrine and the 
shape of the case law, and it aims to elucidate, in straightforward terms, 
what the right of publicity actually is.  
This Article explains how, in the absence of a clear enunciation of its 
scope, courts have come to define the right of publicity negatively, through 
the application of independent defenses based on free speech guarantees 
and copyright preemption. This inverted doctrinal structure has created a 
continuing crisis in the right of publicity, leading to unpredictable 
outcomes and the obstruction of clear thinking about policy concerns. 
The trick to making sense of the right of publicity, it turns out, is to 
understand that the right of publicity is not really one unitary cause of 
action. Instead, as this Article shows, the right of publicity is best 
understood as three discrete rights: an endorsement right, a merchandizing 
entitlement, and a right against virtual impressment. This restructuring 
provides predictability and removes the need to resort to constitutional 
doctrines and preemption analysis to resolve everyday cases. The multiple-
distinct-rights view may also provide pathways to firmer theoretical 
groundings and more probing criticisms. 
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School 
of Law. For suggestions and helpful feedback, I thank Mark McKenna, 
Joanne Clifford, Stephen Yelderman, Daniel B. Kelly, Peter K. Yu, Lisa P. 
Ramsey, Liam S. O’Melinn, Betsy Rosenblatt, Raizel Liebler, Felix Wu, 
Yvette Joy Liebesman, Alexandra J. Roberts, Jake Linford, Sandra L. 
Rierson, Greg Gordon, Deidré A. Keller, Rhett Larson, Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Moon Hee Lee, Wyatt Honse, Todd W. Shaw, and Kit Johnson. 
I am grateful for having had the opportunity to present this work at the 
Notre Dame Law School Intellectual Property Lecture Series, the Texas 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
892 
A&M Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable, the Central States Law 
School Association Conference at the University of Arkansas, and the 
Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at Seton Hall 
University School of Law. © 2017 Eric E. Johnson. Konomark—most 
rights sharable. Please contact the author at www.ericejohnson.com. 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 892
I. HOW THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY GOT TO BE THE WAY IT IS NOW ............................... 895
A. The Traditional Narrative Sketch ................................................................... 895
B. Complications ................................................................................................. 898
C. Appropriation, the Right of Publicity, and Other Labels ............................... 902
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S SUBTRACTIVELY DEFINED SCOPE .................................. 903
A. The Great Overbreadth of the Blackletter Law .............................................. 905
B. The Trouble with Subtractive Demarcation of Law ........................................ 907
C. A Preview of the Three-Rights Approach ....................................................... 909
D. Subtrahends of the Right of Publicity ............................................................. 910
III.	RE-CONCEPTUALIZING ONE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS THREE ..................................... 928
A. The Endorsement Right ................................................................................... 928
B. The Merchandizing Entitlement ...................................................................... 932
C. The Right Against Virtual Impressment .......................................................... 934
IV.	SOME IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................. 938
A. Theoretical Distinctions .................................................................................. 938
B. Precision in Judicial or Legislative Adoption ................................................ 942
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 942
INTRODUCTION 
Since the right of publicity first sprang up some sixty years ago,1 a 
steady stream of scholars has singled it out for disdain: It is theoretically 
unsound.2 It is socially pernicious.3 It is wildly unpredictable in practice.4 
1 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
2 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162–63 (2006) (noting the “absence of any clear theoretical 
foundation” for the right of publicity and concluding that “no one seems to be able to explain exactly 
why individuals should have this right”); William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee 
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 16, 18 
(2012) (noting the lack of wide acceptance of the economic-incentives argument for the right of 
publicity and noting the existence of “many benefits, including monetary benefits, to celebrity status 
separate from the revenue tied to the right of publicity,” and further noting “[t]he Lockean explanation 
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But in all the criticism that has been heaped on the right of publicity, what 
has been ignored is the congenital problem at the center of the doctrine: 
courts have yet to clearly articulate what the right of publicity is. Strangely, 
this fault has been glossed over for decades. 
According to blackletter law, the right of publicity provides persons 
with a cause of action against anyone who makes a commercial use of their 
name, image, likeness, or other indicia of identity. This account, with slight 
variations in language, is recited by countless courts,5 but a moment’s 
reflection demonstrates that it is not true.  
Imagine what would happen if people really could recover just 
because their names are being exploited commercially. Every credit 
reporting agency would shutter instantly. Every celebrity gossip magazine 
would be drowned in liability. And every company that sells customer lists 
may provide a starting point, but it does not clearly explain when there are countervailing policy 
considerations”); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 177–78 (1993) (arguing that the right of publicity expanded in scope and 
jurisdictional recognition despite an absence of compelling rationales); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of 
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2005) (regarding an 
alleged grounding in economic theory, observing that “courts by and large have refused to draw the one 
distinction a theory based on economic value is capable of drawing—between claimants whose 
identities have value and those whose identities do not”).  
3 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 239 (“There is no doubt that the right of publicity makes 
private censorship of popular meaning-making possible. It creates an opportunity for celebrities (or 
their assiguees [sic]) to suppress disfavored meanings and messages.”). 
4 See, e.g., JULEE L. MILHAM, THE PRACTICE OF MUSIC LAW IN FLORIDA ch. XIV (2006) 
(observing that a “stew of standards can make right of publicity actions particularly unpredictable”); 
Joel Anderson, What’s Wrong with This Picture? Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors in the Age of Virtual 
Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 168 (2005) (noting “the crazy-quilt variety of judicial 
decisions that show the unpredictable nature of the law” in the context of actors); Ann Margaret Eames, 
Caught on Tape: Exposing the Unsettled and Unpredictable State of the Right of Publicity, 3 J. HIGH 
TECH. L. 41, 41 (2004) (noting that “[t]he parameters of these permissible or defendable uses are at 
times unclear” and “[t]he lack of defined parameters potentially allows a party to benefit from the 
unauthorized use of another’s identity while the subject in use remains exploited and uncompensated”). 
5 See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“A common 
law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by alleging (1) the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to 
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” 
(citations omitted)); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(“Considering plaintiffs’ appropriation claim, the elements of the tort are: an appropriation, without 
consent, of one’s name or likeness for another’s use or benefit. This branch of the privacy doctrine is 
designed to protect a person from having his name or image used for commercial purposes without 
consent.” (citations omitted)); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003) (“The interest 
protected by the misappropriation of name tort is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his 
own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of 
benefit to him or others.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (explaining that the right of publicity provides a cause of 
action for the appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent 
the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade”). 
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to direct mailers and telemarketers would have to run for the hills. The 
right of publicity, by its own blackletter terms, should stop all these 
commercial uses of identity. Yet it does not. One thing is certain: the right 
of publicity is not what it says it is. 
The right of publicity is not a nullity or a phantom. It exists, and it has 
de facto coherence. Lawyers, judges, and commentators seem generally to 
share an intuitive sense of its boundaries. But those boundaries lack 
meaningful articulation. And the mismatch between what the right of 
publicity is said to be and how it is handled by courts has caused a great 
deal of confusion. 
If any progress is to be made with the right of publicity—whether in 
criticizing it, supporting it, repairing it, or even dismantling it—the first 
order of business should be figuring out what, exactly, it is and how to 
express that. To that end, this Article aims to lay bare the doctrinal 
decrepitude of the right of publicity, explain what havoc it wreaks, and 
propose a reformulation of the doctrine that conforms to its real-world 
scope. Disentangling the doctrine should ultimately be of service to the 
right of publicity’s supporters and its detractors, as well as to those who 
simply want to know, as a practical matter, whether a given situation is 
likely to create liability. 
In endeavoring to clear up the longstanding infirmity of right-of-
publicity doctrine, this Article makes a couple of observations that should 
contribute to a much better understanding of the right of publicity.  
First, unlike most legal doctrines, the right of publicity is currently 
defined negatively. That is, the law lacks a good positive description of 
what the right of publicity is. Instead, the cases are constantly working on 
the question of what the right of publicity is not. Much of the theoretical 
and practical trouble with the right of publicity can be traced to this 
doctrinal inversion.  
The second point is related to the first: The scope of the right of 
publicity is mostly defined extra-doctrinally. That is, instead of being self-
limiting, the right of publicity, by its own letter, expands far beyond its 
permissible scope. It is up to other doctrines from other fields—notably the 
First Amendment and preemption by federal copyright law—to lop off the 
right of publicity’s doctrinal excess and force it back within intuitive limits. 
With the goal of uninverting the doctrinal architecture, this Article 
proposes to recast the blackletter doctrine. The trick to doing this 
successfully is to observe that what courts and commentators have been 
calling “the right of publicity” is really multiple rights: the endorsement 
right, the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual 
impressment.  
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Describing the right of publicity as multiple causes of action rather 
than one is not only more faithful to the state of the law in practice, it 
should also allow us to begin a more fine-tuned theoretical discussion of 
the right of publicity, allowing both proponents and opponents to provide 
more clearly articulated arguments as to when and whether the imposition 
of liability is justifiable.  
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a historical 
framing of the right of publicity. Part II describes the flawed architecture of 
the right of publicity, explaining how current blackletter formulations of 
the right of publicity fail to correspond to the results reached by courts. Part 
III proposes reconceptualizing the right of publicity as three separate 
causes of action. Part IV discusses some implications.  
I. HOW THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY GOT TO BE THE WAY IT IS NOW
Articles about the right of publicity conventionally include a brief
narrative of its history. I will do the same here, but with a critical bent. 
Since this Article’s project is to disentangle the doctrine of the right of 
publicity, it is necessary to confront squarely the law’s convolutions and 
muddles. That being the case, I want to avoid providing a pat, overly tidy 
account of the right of publicity’s origins. So, in this Part, I first set out the 
traditional narrative sketch of the origins of the right of publicity. Next, I 
try to give a sense of how that classic account glosses over substantial 
disorder. Last, I work to untangle varying labels that have been applied to 
the doctrine, including “appropriation” and “misappropriation.” 
A. The Traditional Narrative Sketch
First, in this Section A, I will lay out the classic sketch of how the 
right came to be. This is more than curiosity-satisfying background 
knowledge. Given the opacity of right-of-publicity doctrine itself, the 
origin story provides a way of imposing some sense of order on key right-
of-publicity concepts. But a warning: while not necessarily inaccurate, this 
traditional origin story can be misleading. Smoothing over the chaos in the 
right of publicity’s history makes it seem as if the doctrine has more order 
than it really does. So, in the following Section B, I will try deliberately to 
muss up, at least a little, this classic account. 
The conventional thumbnail sketch of the history of the right of 
publicity generally tracks the one laid out in a comment to the 1995 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.6 It runs like this: the right of 
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b. 
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publicity was born out of tort law’s right of privacy.7 The tort-based right 
of privacy—what can be called the right to be left alone—traces back to a 
seminal 1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right of Privacy.8 Subsequent to Warren and Brandeis’s 
article, the right of privacy was embraced by courts in increasing numbers 
until it became a majority rule in the United States. The right of publicity 
then obtained an independent existence around the mid-twentieth century. 
This emancipation of the right of publicity is principally pinned on two 
references. One is the 1953 baseball-cards case of Haelan Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,9 which used the term “right of 
publicity”10 and is said to be the first case that recognized the right of 
publicity as such.11 The other is a highly influential 1960 law review article 
by William L. Prosser, which, in analyzing seventy years of cases since 
Warren and Brandeis, declared that the right of privacy was really four 
separate torts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure, false light, and 
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness.12 Haelan, according to 
7 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Ky. 2001) (“The common-law right 
of publicity evolved from the appropriation prong of the right of privacy. But ‘it is a distinct cause of 
action intended to vindicate different interests.’ As originally postulated, the right of privacy protects 
one’s right ‘to be let alone.’ Whereas the right of publicity protects the right to control the commercial 
value of one’s identity. The appropriation prong of the invasion of privacy originally sought to 
compensate for the emotional distress accompanied by the unauthorized use of one’s likeness and 
identity. But as the tort has evolved, it is clearly the commercial interests in one’s identity that the 
appropriation prong of tort serves to protect the most.” (footnotes and citations omitted)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (“The principal historical antecedent of 
the right of publicity is the right of privacy.”). 
8 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see 
also Ford, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that “[t]he standard account of the right of publicity begins with 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 article”); M.C. Slough, Privacy, Freedom, and 
Responsibility, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 323, 325–27 (1968) (discussing the seminal importance of Warren 
and Brandeis’s article). 
9 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
10 Although it is fair to give credit to Haelan for sewing on the label “right of publicity” to the 
doctrine it is credited as creating, the Haelan court was not the first to use the phrase “right of 
publicity.” That honor appears to go to an English case. See Kelly v. Morris, 1 Law Rep. Eq. 697, 702 
(1866) (in a case regarding a copyright claim that would not be supported by modern law concerning 
factual information in a business directory, “the defendant goes on in his affidavit to propound a most 
extraordinary doctrine as to the right of publicity in the names of private residents, who had, as he 
expressed it, ‘given their names for public use’”). 
11 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 147 (“Despite intimations in earlier cases, the right of 
publicity was recognized for the first time” in Haelan.). An article titled The Right of Publicity, 
published the year after Haelan, helped give scholarly accreditation to the right of publicity. See 
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). Echoing Haelan, 
Nimmer argued that publicity causes of action were distinct from privacy causes of action, since 
privacy plaintiffs felt injured by intrusion into their lives, whereas publicity plaintiffs merely felt injured 
by a lack of compensation. Id. 
12 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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Prosser, belonged within the fourth category, appropriation of name or 
likeness.13  
Along with pointing to these mileposts in the development of the right 
of publicity, customary accounts of the right of publicity identify a number 
of story arcs or themes to characterize the law’s progression. 
One such theme is that the right of publicity is said to have evolved 
progressively from a tort cause of action to a form of intellectual property.14 
Correspondingly, the right of publicity is said to have represented a 
transition from concern over redressing an injury to concern over enforcing 
property rights.15  
Another historical evolution ascribed to the right of publicity is that in 
its early days the right of publicity was reserved for celebrities—that is, 
those few people who had a present pecuniary value attached to their 
fame—but it has, over the decades, been increasingly recognized as a right 
belonging to the everyday person.16  
Finally, the traditional historical narrative emphasizes the right of 
publicity’s dispersion through the courts and its increasing fixedness in 
law. Indeed, the right of publicity has found a place in the law of a majority 
13 Id. at 406–07. 
14 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The right of publicity grew 
out of the right to privacy torts. . . .”); id. at 151 (“[T]he goal of maintaining a right of publicity is to 
protect the property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and 
effort. Additionally, as with protections for intellectual property, the right of publicity is designed to 
encourage further development of this property interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Comedy III 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (stating that “[t]he right of publicity, 
like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that society deems to have some social utility”). 
Whether, in fact, the right of publicity ought to be considered a form of intellectual property is best 
regarded as an open question—one I won’t weigh in on here. 
15 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (“The 
‘appropriation’ tort as described by Prosser and the Restatement, Second, of Torts subsumes harm to 
both personal and commercial interests caused by an unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiff’s 
identity. Classification of the tort as an aspect of the right of privacy, however, led some courts to deny 
relief to well-known personalities whose celebrity precluded the allegations of injury to solitude or 
personal feelings normally associated with an invasion of privacy. The historical connection with 
personal privacy also impeded the transfer of rights in the commercial value of a person’s identity.”); 
see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:3 (2d ed. 2009) (“The 
ephemeral and relative nature of ‘celebrity’ and ‘fame’ makes such concepts much too slippery to use 
as any firm ground for overall legal analysis.”).  
16 See, e.g., Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995) 
(regarding a common law right-of-publicity action, stating that celebrity status should not be a 
prerequisite for a right-of-publicity claim; what matters is that the plaintiff’s identity has commercial 
value); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“California’s 
appropriation statute is not limited to celebrity plaintiffs.”); Hetter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of 
Nev., 874 P.2d 762, 765 (Nev. 1994) (“The Nevada statute has not limited the cause of action to 
celebrities . . . .”). 
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of American jurisdictions, either by obtaining common law recognition or 
through statutory enactment.17  
B. Complications
The problem with the traditional genesis story of the right of publicity 
is that it may leave the reader with the impression that the law unfolded 
like a seedling tree, putting out branches in an orderly way, as if 
preordained, following some internal logic eventually manifested in the 
doctrine. A more fine-grained look at the development of the right of 
publicity, however, reveals that the doctrine’s origin story is much less tidy 
than the usual account would let on.  
While I will not attempt a thorough re-evaluation of the history of the 
right of publicity here, I do want to draw attention to some of the 
complications in the right of publicity’s development. My aim is to remove 
some of the gloss of orderliness that the right of publicity has accumulated.  
One portion of the history due for some mussing is the Warren and 
Brandeis article.18  
The Warren and Brandeis article is cited with great frequency, almost 
reflexively, by courts19 and scholars20 when the topic of the right of 
publicity comes up. The reference seems obligatory. After all, the Warren 
and Brandeis article is credited with begetting the right of privacy. And the 
right of privacy is, thanks to Prosser, understood to have eventually split 
off into four branches, of which the right of publicity is one. Yet while the 
article may have in fact touched off the chain of jurisprudence that led to 
the right of publicity, the article’s reasoning arguably fails to support the 
modern doctrine at all.  
Warren and Brandeis’s motivation in writing was the burgeoning 
“evils”21 of mass media. They noted that while photographers had formerly 
needed a cooperative subject who sat still for a prolonged exposure, new 
17 See Sean Elliott, Dancing Promotions, Dodging Preemption, and Defending Personas: Why 
Preempting the Right of Publicity Deprives Talent the Publicity Protection They Deserve, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1625, 1634 & n.51 (1998) (collecting citations). 
18 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8. 
19 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (“[T]he authors ably and 
forcefully maintained the existence of a right of privacy . . . .”); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (The article is “an able summary of the extension and development of the law of 
individual rights, which well deserves and will repay the perusal of every lawyer.”). As of January 17, 
2017, the Westlaw database counts 400 cases citing Warren and Brandeis. 
20 As of May 27, 2017, the Westlaw database counts 2,848 law review articles citing Warren and 
Brandeis. 
21 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 198. 
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technology allowed quick, surreptitious snapshots.22 With technology 
ascending, they saw morals sliding. Warren and Brandeis decried the social 
ills of newspaper gossip: “Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak 
side of human nature . . . no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of 
interest in brains capable of other things.”23 These twin developments—the 
quickening of shutter times and the easing of editorial standards—were 
what necessitated the recognition of a tort-based right of privacy. In other 
words, to the extent Warren and Brandeis were able to see into the future, 
what they wanted most to save us from is the cell-phone-video-and-long-
lens-fueled stream of gossip that permeates our society through cable 
television, checkout-aisle news racks, and a vast array of websites and 
social media platforms.  
Insofar as Warren and Brandeis’s article is the ultimate source of the 
right of publicity, it is deeply ironic. For although the right of publicity is 
broad in scope and penetrating in its effects on the media, if there is one 
thing it does not protect against, it is TMZ and the gossip industry. Warren 
and Brandeis had hoped that lawsuits could stop the camera-abetted 
publication of trivialities.24 What we have instead is a legal safe-zone for 
ambush video journalism about celebrities drinking coffee.25 Meanwhile, 
the law provides a solid cause of action for celebrities to use against 
merchandisers selling their likeness on a coffee mug26—something that 
appears entirely removed from Warren and Brandeis’s project. 
If Warren and Brandeis’s article does not provide a firm foundation 
for the right of publicity, one might think the recognized first right-of-
publicity case would—that is, Judge Jerome Frank’s 1953 opinion in the 
Second Circuit case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.27 
The case involved rival manufacturers of chewing gum, both of whom 
packaged baseball cards with their gum. Plaintiff Haelan Labs had an 
exclusive contract with several baseball players to waive their right of 
privacy claims so that Haelan Labs could print baseball cards with their 
22 Id. at 211. 
23 Id. at 196. 
24 Id. (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of 
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade . . . .”). 
25 See TMZ’s Top Coffee Drinkers: It’s Time for the Percolator (Part Two), TMZ (Sept. 30, 2015, 
12:07 PM), http://www.tmz.com/2015/09/30/celeb-coffee-drinking-video/ [https://perma.cc/8SX8-
9CE3]. 
26 See, e.g., Ford & Liebler, supra note 2, at 3 (using likeness-bearing coffee mugs as a classic 
right-of-publicity violation). 
27 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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names and likenesses.28 Notwithstanding the purported exclusivity of those 
contracts, some baseball players subsequently signed similar baseball card 
contracts with Topps.29  
Haelan went to the Second Circuit on a claim of inducing breach of 
contract.30 But the court moved in a different doctrinal direction to resolve 
the case. The court held that, independent of any right of privacy, “a man 
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph.”31 The court explained 
that this right was assignable: “i. e., the right to grant the exclusive 
privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be 
made ‘in gross,’ i. e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of 
anything else.”32 The court then christened the right it had identified with 
the name “right of publicity” and shaped thinking about it for decades to 
come by explaining that the right’s essence was not about hurt feelings—as 
it was with the right of privacy—but about money.33 
The literature generally recognizes this as the birth of the right of 
publicity, not only for its christening, but also for marking two key related 
doctrinal transitions: becoming independent of the right of privacy and 
making a transition from tort to property. This clean picture of the right of 
publicity’s birth, however, glosses over some wrinkles. 
For one, the story of the right of publicity ascending from the tort 
sphere to property sphere is weakened when one considers an often-ignored 
part of Frank’s opinion. “Whether it be labelled a ‘property’ right is 
immaterial,” he wrote, “for here, as often elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ 
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary 
worth.”34 Given this context, it seems likely that Haelan did not mean to 
propertize the doctrine in full. 
Also glossed over is the issue as to whether the acknowledgment of 
the right of publicity, as such, was necessary to the outcome of the case. 
Haelan Labs won 3–0. But on the issue of creating the right of publicity, 
the court was split 2–1. Chief Judge Thomas Walter Swan issued a terse 
concurrence agreeing with the panel only insofar as perceiving a cause of 
28 Id. at 867. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 869. 
31 Id. at 868. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through 
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements . . . .”). 
34 Id. 
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action for intentional inducement of breach of contract.35 Swan’s 
concurrence suggests that the majority’s statements acknowledging the 
existence of a right-of-publicity cause of action should have been regarded 
as dicta, on the grounds that it was not necessary to the disposition of the 
case.36 
What is more, instead of creating the right of publicity as an evolution 
or derivation of the right of privacy, the court claimed to rely on two cases 
it said had already recognized the right.37 This supposition, however, does 
not stand up to scrutiny. One of the two cases was Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff 
Gordon,38 a contracts case whose result is consistent with a straightforward 
theory of trademark rights in a name and which implies nothing about a 
right of publicity.39 The other case, Madison Square Garden Corp. v. 
Universal Pictures Co.,40 is even further removed from anything 
resembling a right of publicity. In that case, a sports arena sued a film 
studio for inserting into a movie crowd-scene footage filmed at the arena.41 
While Madison Square Garden Corp. is an analytical muddle,42 it is clear 
the decision could not have rested implicitly or otherwise on the right of 
publicity, for there was no issue of a commercial exploitation of the 
identity of any identifiable natural person in the case—a commonality of all 
right of publicity violations.43  
35 Id. at 869 (Swan, C.J., concurring). 
36 See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 261 (1921) (To have 
“the weight of a precedent,” a proposition must be “necessary for the decision of a particular case”; 
otherwise it is dictum.). It should be noted that what in an opinion ought to be regarded as dicta is 
subject to considerable debate. See, e.g., Ryan S. Killian, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 8–15 (discussing differing ideas of what constitutes dicta). 
37 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
38 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
39 Id. (“The defendant styles herself ‘a creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a sale. Manufacturers 
of dresses, millinery, and like articles are glad to pay for a certificate of her approval. The things which 
she designs, fabrics, parasols, and what not, have a new value in the public mind when issued in her 
name.”). 
40 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938). 
41 Id. at 847. 
42 The clearest thing that can be said about the decision is that the court, seemingly unconcerned 
with doctrine or precedent, emphasized its equitable power and painted the question before it as being 
about “whether the acts complained of are fair or unfair.” Id. at 853. Interestingly, the case was later 
relied upon by National Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc., 931 F. 
Supp. 1124, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), in issuing a permanent injunction against a business distributing 
real-time sports scores and information by pager. That decision was vacated by the Second Circuit, 
which held that to the extent New York law allowed a misappropriation claim for the sports data, it was 
preempted by the Copyright Act. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845–54 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
43 See, e.g., Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]here is no 
right of publicity in a corporation . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
902 
Much more could be said about the episodic chaos in the origins of the 
right of publicity. But I hope with these few examples I have done 
something to dispel the patina of orderliness that comes with an idealized 
version of the right of publicity’s development. My suspicion is that the 
overly romanticized origin story of the right of publicity and its frequent 
repetition have contributed to the fact that courts and commentators have 
generally not engaged with what should be glaring doctrinal problems with 
the way the right of publicity is formulated. 
C. Appropriation, the Right of Publicity, and Other Labels
As a final matter of setting the stage for talking about the present state 
of the right of publicity and its doctrinal problems, it is necessary to 
address the confusing issue of labels—in particular, the use of the term 
“appropriation” in lieu of “right of publicity.” 
Prosser, in his influential 1960 article, labeled his fourth privacy tort 
“appropriation,”44 although he noted the use of the label “right of publicity” 
in the Haelan case.45 Prosser’s article, as influential as it was, created a 
question of whether the cause of action ought to go by the label 
“appropriation” or “right of publicity.” This issue has remained unresolved.  
Even worse, the persistence of two labels seems unwittingly to have 
spawned the idea that the two labels might denote two separate doctrines. 
Many pragmatic commentators have found that “right of publicity” and 
“misappropriation” tend to be used interchangeably in the cases.46 And the 
U.S. Supreme Court has lumped the terms together.47  
Nonetheless, some authors have tried to distinguish appropriation (or 
“misappropriation”) from the right of publicity. For example, one 
commentator offered that the appropriation tort “centers on damage to 
human dignity” while the right of publicity “relates to commercial damage 
to the business value of human identity.”48 Consistent with this line of 
§ 46 cmt. d (1995) (“The interest in personal dignity and autonomy that underlies both publicity and
privacy rights limits application of the right of publicity to natural persons. The protection available
against the unauthorized use of corporate or institutional identities is determined by the rules governing
trademarks and trade names.”). 
44 Prosser, supra note 12, at 401.  
45 Id. at 406–07.  
46 See, e.g., KELLI L. SAGER, SUMMARY OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ISSUES 1 n.1 (2012), 
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/Summary_of_Right_of_Publicity_Issues.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KQW-DVGU]. 
47 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977) (using the terms 
“right of publicity” and “appropriation” to describe a claim that is importantly different from a false 
light claim). 
48 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:6 (4th 
ed. 2009). 
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thinking, the Missouri Supreme Court called misappropriation and the right 
of publicity “separate yet similar” causes of action, with misappropriation 
protecting “private self-esteem and dignity” and the right of publicity 
protecting against “commercial loss.”49 Then—after chiding the plaintiff for 
mislabeling a right-of-publicity action as misappropriation—the Missouri 
Supreme Court noted that “the elements of the two torts are essentially the 
same” and unabashedly proceeded to use “misappropriation” cases as 
precedent for the “right of publicity” case before it.50 If precedent can be 
applied interchangeably, there seems to be little point in insisting on the 
existence of two separate causes of action. 
It is hard to blame courts and commentators for trying to be helpful in 
making sense of the different labels. But at the end of the day, 
distinguishing appropriation from the right of publicity may be as helpful 
as asking a four-year-old to rake up leaves: instead of cleaning things up, it 
ends up making a bigger mess. 
In this Article, I treat appropriation (or misappropriation) and the right 
of publicity as one. The fact is, to the extent one might perceive differences 
between cases labeled as “appropriation” and those labeled “right of 
publicity,” whatever fine distinctions one might find are dwarfed by bigger, 
more fundamental differences in the scope of liability imposed by different 
clusters of cases. And it is those more fundamental differences I am trying 
to delineate in this Article. 
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S SUBTRACTIVELY DEFINED SCOPE
The blackletter formulation of the right of publicity51 persists in a state
of illimitability, giving no meaningful guidance as to what the right of 
publicity is. The courts instead give the doctrine its essential shape by 
saying what the right of publicity is not. In this Part, I explain how this 
negative delimiting52 of the right of publicity works, and I suggest why it is 
troublesome. 
49 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003). 
50 Id. at 368–69. 
51 That is, that the right of publicity gives a plaintiff a cause of action against anyone making a 
commercial use of the plaintiff’s name, image, voice, likeness, or other indicia of identity. See supra 
note 5. 
52 In talking about the “negative” aspect to the doctrinal structure of the right of publicity, let me 
head off a possible point of confusion. Intellectual property scholars have used the term “negative 
space” to describe “areas in which creation and innovation thrive without significant protection from 
intellectual property law.” Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 317 (2011). These negative spaces include “fashion, cuisine, magic tricks, stand-up comedy, 
typefaces, open source software, sports, wikis, academic science and even roller derby pseudonyms.” 
Id.; see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
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In saying what the right of publicity is not, the courts largely rely on 
two doctrinal vehicles: (1) freedom of expression (including the application 
of the First Amendment and a “newsworthiness exception”) and (2) 
copyright preemption. There are, as well, other ad hoc means of subtracting 
from the scope of the right of publicity, including an “incidental use” 
exception and, on occasion, the selective ignoring of law or the facts of the 
case. I am going to use the word “subtrahend” to refer to all of these 
doctrinal vehicles that are variously used to give right-of-publicity doctrine 
its shape through subtractive or negative means.53  
Let me be explicit about the claim I am making. I am not simply 
pointing out that the First Amendment, copyright preemption, and other 
defenses serve as external limitations on the right of publicity. That is 
unremarkable. The First Amendment, for instance, serves as an external 
limitation on all kinds of law.54 The difference is that other areas of law are 
meaningfully demarcated doctrines in themselves—even in the absence of 
the First Amendment. We can routinely say, for example, that there is 
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this situation, but 
not in that situation, all without resort to constitutional law. The intentional 
infliction of emotional distress case where the First Amendment comes into 
play is the outlier.  
The right of publicity is different. The right of publicity is utterly 
dependent upon the First Amendment and other subtrahends to give it its 
essential shape. When the First Amendment comes up in other tort or 
property contexts, it is generally a case of the Constitution imposing itself 
in the proceedings, blocking the common law from what it would do if left 
to its own devices. The right of publicity, however, seems to be without its 
own devices. In right-of-publicity cases, the First Amendment is a tool the 
courts reach for in order to work the common law into some tenable form. 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1764 (2006) (introducing the term “negative space” 
in this sense). In talking about how the right of publicity’s scope is defined subtractively or negatively, I 
am talking about something quite distinct from intellectual property’s negative space, as scholars have 
talked about it. IP’s negative spaces are places where the scope of the law has not previously been 
extended, even nominally. Thus, the discussion of IP negative spaces is not concerned with the means 
by which courts demarcate the boundaries of IP doctrines, which is what I am concerned with here. 
53 In mathematics, a “subtrahend” is a quantity that is subtracted from another quantity. WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2281 (1993) (defining “subtrahend” as “a quantity that is to 
be deducted from a minuend in the mathematical operation of subtraction”). 
54 One example is intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 
451 (2011). 
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The same goes for copyright preemption and the other subtrahends. They 
end up more as servants of the common law than masters of it.55 
In this Part, I begin in Section A by reviewing the blackletter 
formulation of the right of publicity, pointing out the implausibility of its 
nominal scope. Then, in Section B, I discuss the problems inherent in 
delineating legal doctrine negatively—that is, starting with an implausibly 
expansive doctrine and then subtracting from its scope to reach palatable 
results—rather than building doctrine positively in such a way that the 
doctrine explains its own boundaries. Finally, in Section C, I look at the 
right of publicity’s subtrahends in detail, providing multiple examples of 
how courts have used free expression rights, copyright preemption, and 
other devices to give the right of publicity meaningful shape. 
A. The Great Overbreadth of the Blackletter Law
One media law litigator summed up the state of right-of-publicity 
doctrine aptly, if not flatteringly, when he wrote that the field of publicity 
rights “remains a ‘Wild West’ environment.”56 For fellow litigators, he saw 
upside in this, advising that they “should feel free to be creative in their 
proposed theories.”57 From a more objective standpoint, however, the 
doctrine is in a woeful state. Cases are all over the map in terms of 
outcomes and analysis.58 There is, however, one aspect in which right-of-
publicity cases are remarkably consistent: the broad terms in which they 
describe the blackletter law.  
Some examples: In California, “an individual’s right to publicity is 
invaded if another appropriates for his advantage the individual’s name, 
image, identity or likeness.”59 In Illinois, an action requires “an 
appropriation, without consent, of one’s name or likeness for another’s use 
or benefit,” and “is designed to protect a person from having his name or 
image used for commercial purposes without consent.”60 The 1977 
55 In this paragraph, for the sake of concision, I have spoken of the common law. The same, 
however, can be said of the varied state statutes providing for right-of-publicity causes of action with 
broad formulations that mimic the common law. 
56 Brian D. Wassom, Identity and Its Consequences: The Importance of Self-Image, Social Media, 
and the Right of Publicity to IP Litigators, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING KEY DECISIONS AND EFFECTIVELY LITIGATING IP CASES 
*1 (2012).
57 Id. 
58 See infra Section II.D for examples. 
59 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
60 Dwyer v. Am. Exp. Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citations omitted). 
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Restatement of Torts says, “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit 
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability . . . .”61 
Note that these descriptions of the right of publicity embrace not only 
classic situations creating liability, such as unlicensed celebrity-image-
bearing lunch boxes or making a person appear to endorse a product. These 
formulations also embrace what credit reporting agencies do—which is 
attach financial data to person’s identities and then commercially exploit 
those identities by selling credit reports to banks and other entities 
interested in knowing a person’s financial history.62 That is, 
unquestionably, appropriating a person’s name and other indicia of identity 
for the credit agency’s own benefit.63 Yet the right of publicity does not, in 
the real world, reach such situations.64  
Similarly, the blackletter definition creates liability for celebrity 
gossip magazines, whose business is entirely devoted to using, for purposes 
of commercial gain, the names and images of celebrities. Yet it is taken for 
granted that there is no right-of-publicity liability for such magazines—or 
for the photographers and reporters who stock their pages.65 
Common law formulations of the right of publicity are not the only 
ones that are nonsensically overbroad. Many statutes are similarly 
unbounded. Wisconsin’s statute, for instance, allows a cause of action for 
“[t]he use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, of the name, 
portrait or picture of any living person, without having first obtained the 
written consent of the person.”66 Rhode Island’s statute provides, simply, 
“The right to be secure from an appropriation of one’s name or likeness,” 
and for establishing a violation of the right, the statute requires only proof 
that the appropriation was without consent and that it is “of a benefit to 
someone other than the claimant.”67 Ensuring additional breadth, the statute 
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
62 For background on credit reporting agencies, their business model, and their economic 
incentives, see Virginia G. Maurer & Robert E. Thomas, Getting Credit Where Credit Is Due: Proposed 
Changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 610–12 (1997).  
63 Here I am translating “appropriate” as to “take (something) for one’s own use.” NEW OXFORD 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 77 (3d ed. 2010). Interestingly, the New Oxford American Dictionary’s use-in-
a-sentence example of appropriate, in its verb form, is a right-of-publicity usage: “[H]is images have 
been appropriated by advertisers.” Id. 
64 See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005, 1009–10 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting claim 
of appropriation where a “private investigator or information broker obtains a social security number 
from a credit reporting agency . . . and then sells the information”). 
65 To the extent anyone tried to bring such a futile claim, a successful First Amendment defense 
would be assured. Regarding the use of the First Amendment to circumscribe the scope of the right of 
publicity, see infra Section II.D.1. 
66 WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(b) (2014). 
67 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 9-1-28.1(a)(2) (2016). 
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expressly provides that there does not need to be any publication for 
liability to attach.68 Both Wisconsin’s and Rhode Island’s statutes would, 
for example, encompass the activities of credit-reporting agencies and 
gossip magazines. 
So if the blackletter incarnation of the right of publicity does not 
describe the confines of the doctrine, what does? Answering that question 
is the ultimate aim of this Article, and I attempt to set out an answer in Part 
III, further below. Next, however, I want to discuss what is troublesome 
about defining legal doctrine by what it is not rather than by what it is. 
B. The Trouble with Subtractive Demarcation of Law
To analogize to sculpture,69 the right of publicity’s blackletter doctrine 
is like a large, shapeless block of material—wood or marble, for example. 
That block represents the scope of prohibited conduct—that is, conduct for 
which liability will occur under the right of publicity. The subtrahends are 
tools for cleaving away portions of the block, thus giving the right of 
publicity its essential shape. The process is subtractive. Courts carve away 
what they don’t want.  
The subtractive or big-block-of-marble method is not how most legal 
doctrines are constructed. Most legal doctrines, if they are like sculptures, 
are made from clay. They get their essential shape from the deliberate 
adding of material. It is an accretive process. Liability, like clay, is added 
as needed, and the doctrine takes on the appropriate size and shape.70 
A skilled sculptor can get to the same form whether she or he starts 
with a block of marble and subtracts, or starts with a void and adds clay. 
But the law is not indifferent to these two techniques. When doctrine is 
created in a common law manner, the accretive method works well, but the 
subtractive method can be disastrous. 
To continue with the sculpture analogy, just as subtractive sculpting 
generates a lot of waste, so too there is a price to pay with defining the right 
of publicity in a subtractive manner. The most obvious problem is that it is 
inefficient: we must work our way through multiple levels of analysis, 
68 Id. § 9-1-28.1(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
69 I am not the first to analogize the common law to sculpture. Unfortunately, other authors’ uses of 
the metaphor seem to diverge from my broader point. See infra notes 70–71. I also acknowledge that, in 
service of a metaphor to explain law, my portrayal of sculpture is necessarily simplistic and that the 
artistic process of many must go far afield of my characterization.  
70 That is not to say that the common law results in a static doctrine that is polished, smoothed, and 
set into a museum. See Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of 
Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 109 (1962) (“It may be received 
learning that the path of the common law resembles rather the gnarled oak than the clean lines of a 
Brancusi sculpture.”). 
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bringing in law from other areas, just to get in the neighborhood of the 
correct result. In the litigation context, issues that are more complicated to 
resolve are also generally more expensive to resolve. 
Perhaps worse, the added analytical complexity makes right-of-
publicity problems more prone to erratic results and thus makes the case 
law less scrutable for lawyers who want to provide solid advice to clients. 
One case is never exactly the same as another, and law defined by 
precedent has fuzzy boundaries. But when the law is built up additively, the 
fuzziness is less problematic than when the law is defined negatively. This 
is because we are better guided by precedent that tells us where scope of 
doctrine has been found to extend in the past, rather than by precedent 
centered around saying where it has been found not to exist.  
Beyond the inefficiency, however, there is a larger and more 
important problem with the negative way in which right-of-publicity 
doctrine is structured: it leads to bad law. 
With sculpture, there is generally one artist with one unitary vision of 
what the sculpture should look like in the end. Thus, either accretive or 
subtractive techniques can yield the same result. When working with 
marble, for instance, the sculptor does not decide where to chisel based on 
what chunks of the marble she or he does not like.71 Instead, the sculptor 
chisels material away as a means of reaching a pre-envisioned shape. 
Unlike a sculpture, however, which is authored by one artist, legal 
doctrines are authored by a crowd. An unbounded number of judges each 
leave a mark on the doctrine by way of trying to resolve a single case at a 
time.  
The fact that the common law generally works well, despite being 
authored by an uncoordinated crowd, depends in large part on the fact that 
most doctrines are shaped in an additive way. Judges add liability here and 
there where doing so is warranted.72 Doctrine can evolve in the direction of 
efficiency and justice despite a lack of coordination under any one 
individual’s vision.73  
71 But cf. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433, 448 (2011) (“In a 
common law system it is not unusual for courts to consider all relevant facts and to allow the legal 
principles to reveal themselves over time, as when a sculptor carves away everything that does not 
belong in the finished image.”). 
72 That is not to suggest, of course, that even when working in an overall accretive or additive 
mode the courts won’t trim back on liability when circumstances change, or that they won’t engage in 
some fine-tuning by sanding down rough spots. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 5 (1881) (discussing how rules are modified according to backwards-constructed policy 
rationales). 
73 An example might be the addition of strict liability for defective products alongside existing 
negligence law. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (introducing 
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The common law, however, does not work so well in the big-block-of-
marble mode. That is the lesson of the right of publicity. Judges have been 
cleaving off from the right of publicity those aspects of it with which they 
are uncomfortable, rather than building up what is needed.  
The object now left on the pedestal looks very different than it would 
if it had been built through addition. First, the scope of liability that 
remains from this subtractive mode is—as it necessarily must be—too 
large. There is margin between the scope of liability we care enough to add 
and the scope of liability we care enough to hack off. Thus, if the doctrine 
is shaped negatively, it will retain that margin. Second, what remains is 
inevitably unsound in terms of theory and policy. The scope of liability, as 
it persists in whole, reflects no affirmative judgment that it ought to be 
there, because subtracting only what is unwanted in a particular case is 
done without thinking through whether to retain the remainder. Thus, the 
doctrine ends up being misshapen—unhewed to reason, policy, or theory. 
Another way to think about how the subtractive method creates bad 
law is to consider that wherever the right of publicity extends, it excludes 
some quantum of freedom. If we believe freedom should generally be the 
default under the law—whether out of a moral conviction about liberty or 
an economic ideology rooted in laissez-faire thought—then the subtractive 
method of developing common law doctrine is troubling: The right of 
publicity begins as a large block of prohibition, thus needlessly burdening 
freedom by requiring judges to form a juridical rationale to provide for a 
lack of prohibition in a particular case. 
Throughout this discussion of the troubles stemming from the 
subtractive demarcation of law, I have spoken of the right of publicity as a 
common law doctrine. The same concepts, however, apply where the right 
of publicity is based in a statute. Right-of-publicity statutes provide, by 
their letter, for a sweeping scope of liability,74 leaving it up to the courts to 
carve that scope down to some tenable size through ad hoc means. 
C. A Preview of the Three-Rights Approach
Next, I want to move from the abstract to the specific and discuss the 
subtrahends the courts have used to carve the right of publicity. Before I 
do, however, I want to take advantage of an opportunity that will allow my 
discussion of the subtrahends to perform double duty.  
strict products liability); see also Jill Wieber Lens, Warning: A Post-Sale Duty to Warn Targets Small 
Manufacturers, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1013, 1038 (discussing Greenman). 
74 See, e.g., supra notes 66–68. 
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In Part III of this Article, I suggest a way to build a positive 
conceptualization of the right of publicity by conceiving of it as three 
particular rights. Here I want to preview those three rights. Then, as I 
explore the subtrahends, I will be able to point out how those subtrahends 
tend to be used in such a way as to not tread on those three rights. 
The three separate rights are (1) an endorsement right, (2) a 
merchandising entitlement, and (3) a right against virtual impressment. The 
endorsement right is the right to not be featured in advertising in a way that 
implies an endorsement of a commercial enterprise—featuring a celebrity 
wearing a brand of shoes in an ad for those shoes would infringe.75 The 
merchandising entitlement provides a right to not have one’s name, image, 
or identity marketed on coffee mugs, lunch boxes, or other merchandise.76 
And the right against virtual impressment—which can be perceived only in 
a limited number of jurisdictions—protects one’s image and identity from 
being employed, marionette-like, as a virtual actor in a film or video 
game.77  
D. Subtrahends of the Right of Publicity
Now I will move from the abstract to the concrete, providing 
examples of how courts have used free expression guarantees, copyright 
preemption, and other means to excuse the imposition of liability in cases 
unilluminated by the right of publicity’s sprawling doctrine.  
1. The First Amendment, Freedom of Expression, and
Newsworthiness.—With the blackletter right-of publicity doctrine
being as broad as it is, the First Amendment is constantly called upon to do 
the frontline work of deciding in run-of-the-mill cases whether an action 
for right-of-publicity infringement can be maintained.78 That is, instead of 
policing the law at its outer bounds or in its broadest strokes, the First 
Amendment is invoked to micromanage the application of right of publicity 
law and resolve routine cases.79  
75 See infra Section III.A. 
76 See infra Section III.B. 
77 See infra Section III.C. The virtual-impressment type of right-of-publicity case is much rarer 
than cases of the endorsement or merchandizing type. 
78 See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and 
Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 292 
(2000) (“[T]he right of publicity has been somewhat unusual because, from its earliest roots in the tort 
law of privacy, writers have acknowledged that the First Amendment plays a limiting role. . . . [H]ow 
large a role has been greatly and continuously underestimated.”). 
79 See, e.g., Andreas N. Andrews, Stop Copying Me: Rethinking Rights of Publicity Verses the First 
Amendment, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 130 (2013) (“Traditionally, the vast majority of 
defenses against right of publicity claims focused on the First Amendment.”); see also Drew Sherman, 
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The interaction of the First Amendment and the right of publicity is 
puzzling.80 In the right-of-publicity context, the First Amendment is both 
incredibly weak and incredibly strong. It is weak because the courts have 
made it clear in a number of ways that the right of publicity can proceed 
largely unhassled by the First Amendment because of the right of 
publicity’s economic-incentive rationale and its status as a property right.81 
On the other hand, one does not need to read many cases to see that the 
right of publicity is dogged by the First Amendment at every turn.  
Let me try to sharpen this point. I am not talking about cases brought 
with the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of right-of-publicity 
statutes. Of course such cases would require the involvement of the First 
Amendment, just as cases challenging the constitutionality of gun laws will 
require involvement of the Second Amendment. But suppose that most 
criminal trials involving a weapons charge required Second Amendment 
analysis to resolve. That would be analogous to the current state of right-of-
publicity litigation.  
Exactly how much the First Amendment limits the right of publicity, 
and what tests should be used when deciding the matter, have long been 
vexing for courts and scholars.82 One might wonder, how can courts apply 
the First Amendment so routinely in right-of-publicity cases without well-
articulated tests or standards for doing so? The answer to this question is 
that it points up a false dilemma. Using the First Amendment to resolve a 
right-of-publicity case is not constitutional jurisprudence—not really. It is 
better thought of as ordinary, non-constitutional private-law jurisprudence, 
done under a First Amendment label. In other words, we should not be 
vexed by the lack of articulation of First Amendment law in the right-of-
publicity context. We should be troubled instead by the lack of articulation 
The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment Defense in California, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 29, 29 
(2004) (“Freedom of speech under the First Amendment is a common defense to the right of publicity 
action.”). 
80 Addressing intellectual property scholars at a symposium, Mary-Rose Papandrea said, “I am a 
First Amendment scholar, and the right of publicity often seems in conflict with everything I know 
about the freedom of expression. Except for those cases involving fraudulent commercial endorsement, 
the right of publicity seems largely unsupportable [under First Amendment strictures].” Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Where Intellectual Property and Free Speech Collide, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2009). 
81 See the discussion of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977), infra 
notes 99–105 and accompanying text.  
82 See, e.g., Note, First Amendment — Right of Publicity — Missouri Supreme Court Creates 
“Predominant Purpose” Test for First Amendment Defenses to Publicity Right Claims. — Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Twist v. McFarlane, 2004 WL 46675 
(U.S. Jan 12, 2004) (No. 03-615), 117 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2004) (“The extent to which the First 
Amendment protects a defendant in a right of publicity case is an issue that has vexed courts and 
commentators . . . .”). 
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of right-of-publicity law that leads courts constantly to invoke the First 
Amendment. 
One way to see the nature of the problem is to look at this through the 
lens of constitutional avoidance. As a general matter, courts seek to avoid 
reaching constitutional questions by interpreting statutes in a way that 
prevents serious doubts about their constitutionality.83 But that principle is 
frequently thrown to the wind in right-of-publicity cases, as the First 
Amendment often seems to be the first thing courts reach for in explaining 
why a plaintiff must lose in everyday cases.84  
Some legal authorities do seek to conform to norms of constitutional 
avoidance insofar they may bring in free expression rights under some 
banner other than the First Amendment. For instance, First Amendment-
type concerns may be addressed under the label of a “newsworthiness” 
exception or privilege.85 California’s statute, for instance, has a “news” and 
“public affairs” exception that serves as a statute-based means of bringing 
free speech protections to bear without directly invoking the First 
Amendment.86 And sometimes courts seek to introduce some sheltering 
vagueness by using “First Amendment” as an adjective, speaking in terms 
of “First Amendment considerations.”87 Notwithstanding the occasional 
nods to constitutional avoidance, however, there is an epidemic of courts 
dealing with right-of-publicity litigation by directly invoking the First 
Amendment without first trying to re-interpret statutory language or clarify 
common law doctrine.88  
83 See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 181–82 (explaining that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance “encourages a 
court to adopt one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to avoid deciding a tough 
constitutional question”). The doctrine is “also known as the ‘avoidance canon.’” Id. at 181. 
84 I discuss examples of this below. 
85 Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995) (“The newsworthiness 
privilege applies to advertisements for books, films, and other publications concerning matters of public 
interest. A plaintiff cannot recover for misappropriation based upon the use of his identity or likeness in 
a newsworthy publication unless the use has ‘no real relationship’ to the subject matter of the 
publication.” (citation omitted)). 
86 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d) (2016) (“For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or 
any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).”). 
87 E.g., Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 
457 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Furthermore, to the extent that courts have been reluctant to extend the right of 
publicity to depictions of life-stories based on First Amendment considerations, those considerations are 
no less relevant whether the work in question is fictional, non-fictional or a combination of the two.” 
(citation omitted)). 
88 For an example of this, see infra note 97 (discussing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977)). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the right of publicity and its 
interaction with the First Amendment only once. Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. concerned a claim under Ohio law brought by 
“human cannonball” Hugo Zacchini, who performed his daredevil act at the 
Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio.89 In a performance that lasted all of 
15 seconds, Zacchini was shot from a cannon to land in a net about 200 feet 
away.90 The dispute arose out of a visit by a freelance reporter with a video 
camera. When Zacchini first saw the man, he asked him not to film his 
performance.91 And the reporter initially complied.92 But the next day, on 
instructions from a news producer, the reporter returned to the fair and 
videoed the entire act, which was then shown on the local news.93 Zacchini 
sued. The broadcast of his cannonball act apparently offended his sense of 
family pride: Zacchini asserted that the act, which his father invented, had 
been performed exclusively by the Zacchini family for the past half 
century.94  
As plaintiff, Zacchini pursued his lawsuit on a variety of claims that 
ultimately proved unworkable, including the tort of conversion and a claim 
based on a purported common law copyright.95 The Ohio Supreme Court, 
however, did entertain his suit on the basis of a “right to the publicity value 
of his performance.”96 Although the Ohio high court impliedly recognized 
that Zacchini had proved a prima facie violation of the right of publicity, 
the court nonetheless ruled in favor of the broadcaster on the basis of the 
First Amendment.97 
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Zacchini vaulted the First Amendment to 
a win with a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Byron White that 
89 433 U.S. at 563. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 563–64. 




96 Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 1976), 
rev’d and remanded, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)). The blackletter law from Ohio that the U.S. Supreme Court 
understood the cause of action to rest on was “first that one may not use for his own benefit the name or 
likeness of another, whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one, and second that respondent 
would be liable for the appropriation, over petitioner’s objection and in the absence of license or 
privilege, of petitioner’s right to the publicity value of his performance.” Id.; see also Zacchini, 351 
N.E.2d at 459–60. 
97 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565–66. The U.S. Supreme Court noted specifically that the Ohio Supreme 
Court did not rest on state law, and that it was because of the lack of an adequate and independent state 
ground that the U.S. Supreme Court appropriately granted certiorari to decide the First Amendment 
issue. Id. at 566. 
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emphasized the economic-incentive rationale of the right of publicity.98 
Observing that perfecting the human cannonball act required great talent 
and effort, Justice White reasoned that “if the public can see the act free on 
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.”99 Broadcasting 
the act on TV thus “poses a substantial threat to the economic value” of 
Zacchini’s act.”100 
In this way, Justice White’s opinion found the state’s interest in 
protecting an individual’s proprietary interest to encourage such 
entertainment101 to be persuasive in allowing the right-of-publicity claim to 
proceed—the First Amendment notwithstanding: 
Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more 
than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in 
his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the 
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This 
same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by 
this Court. . . . These laws . . . were intended definitely to grant valuable, 
enforceable rights in order to afford greater encouragement to the production 
of works of benefit to the public. The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from 
making a similar choice here in deciding to protect the entertainer’s incentive 
in order to encourage the production of this type of work.102  
By putting the right of publicity into the same constitutional basket as 
copyright, the Supreme Court’s rationale gave the right of publicity a 
powerful shield to blunt what blows the First Amendment might strike 
against it. Wendy Gordon notes that because copyrights are classified as 
property, “courts seem willing to overlook the most basic canons of the law 
of free expression.”103 Enforcing a prior restraint against speech, as she 
points out, is “one of the most troublesome things a judge can do under 
classic First Amendment jurisprudence. . . . Yet in copyright cases judges 
routinely enjoin books prior to publication without even appearing to notice 
the anomaly.”104 And while defamation law—as a species of tort—is 
subject to intensive First Amendment policing, copyright—as a species of 
intellectual property—tends to get a free pass under the First 
98 Id. at 575. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 573 (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
102 Id. at 576–77 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted). 
103 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1536 (1993). 
104 Id. at 1536–37. 
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Amendment.105 Thus, by analogizing the right of publicity to copyrights, 
Zacchini seems to have given the right of publicity exceptional status with 
regard to free expression guarantees.106  
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not revisited the right of 
publicity since Zacchini seems to be a clear signal that state legislatures 
and courts are free to apply and even expand the right of publicity with 
little worry about First Amendment impingement. In this vein, it is 
particularly telling to consider the appellate posture of Zacchini. The Ohio 
Supreme Court fettered its own common law by imposing First 
Amendment limitations, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the basis 
that the First Amendment did not function to limit the Ohio law as the Ohio 
court had said it did.  
Why then, if the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that the First 
Amendment will treat the right of publicity with a light touch, have lower 
and state courts brought the hammer of the First Amendment down on the 
right of publicity over and over again? It is part of the right of publicity’s 
dysmorphia that courts interpreting state law have reached for the First 
Amendment to bash the doctrine into the shape they want. That is, instead 
of the First Amendment providing an externally imposed outer boundary 
on the reach of state law, courts have been using free speech rights to laser 
away unwanted liability.  
Examples abound, but I will start with three cases. In Guglielmi v. 
Spelling-Goldberg Productions, a 1979 California Supreme Court case, the 
court held that a motion picture about silent film heartthrob actor Rudolph 
Valentino was protected from right-of-publicity liability on the basis of the 
First Amendment.107 In New Kids on the Block v. News America, a 1992 
case, a California federal court used the First Amendment to halt a right-of-
105 Id. at 1537 (“Similarly, in libel and related areas of tort law the Supreme Court has held that the 
First Amendment requires giving the defendant special privileges, yet no constitutional privileges are 
provided when suits are brought under copyright or trademark. It is supposed that as long as ideas are 
free for all to use, no harm to free speech can result from forbidding the copying of expression.” 
(footnotes omitted)). Note that since Gordon wrote, the First Amendment has been significantly brought 
to bear on some of the more expansive and leading-edge invocations of trademark. See, e.g., Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The First Amendment may offer little 
protection for a competitor who labels its commercial good with a confusingly similar mark, but 
trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is 
communicating ideas or expressing points of view. Were we to ignore the expressive value that some 
marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected by the First 
Amendment.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). 
106 It should be noted that part of the rationale for copyright’s quasi-immunity from the First 
Amendment comes from the understanding that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and fair-use 
defense give copyright “built-in First Amendment accommodations.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
190 (2003) (citation omitted).  
107 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979). 
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publicity claim by a boy band against a newspaper using the band 
members’ names in connection with a pay-to-call 1-900-number survey to 
determine the most popular or sexiest New Kid.108 In Gionfriddo v. Major 
League Baseball, a 2001 case, a California court held that the First 
Amendment privileged professional baseball to print game-day programs, 
publish websites, and release documentaries with names and identities of 
retired ballplayers who had never given their consent for such commercial 
exploitations—actions that, otherwise, would ostensibly qualify as common 
law right-of-publicity infringement.109  
Guglielmi, New Kids on the Block, and Gionfriddo illustrate the wide 
array of cases in which the First Amendment is applied as a constraint. But 
note that neither Guglielmi, nor New Kids on the Block, nor Gionfriddo fall 
into any of the three categories of endorsement right, merchandising 
entitlement, or right against virtual impressment.110 
One area in which the First Amendment has been used repeatedly to 
strike down right-of-publicity claims is in the context of non-fictional 
books. A leading case is Matthews v. Wozencraft, in which the Fifth Circuit 
decided that the First Amendment barred a former law-enforcement 
officer’s right-of-publicity claim for portraying his life in a book and 
movie.111 The cases do not disclose a per se rule making biographies First 
Amendment protected, but biography cases have led to consistent 
defendant victories.112 While the First Amendment interest in non-fiction 
books is clearly strong, courts could reach the same result in these cases 
without confronting free speech rights at all by noting that non-fiction 
constitutes neither endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual 
impressment. 
A case that may illustrate how the First Amendment can be an ill fit in 
right-of-publicity cases is C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., in which the Eighth Circuit used 
the First Amendment to stop a right-of-publicity claim against the use of 
108 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
109 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The court stopped short of saying that a cause 
of action was stated for common law right-of-publicity infringement, because it proceeded straight to 
the constitutional analysis. Id. at 313. 
110 That is not to say that one couldn’t make the argument that one or more of these cases are a 
close call with one of the categories. In fact, the extent to which that might be true could be seen as the 
unarticulated motivation for litigating the case to the appellate stage. 
111 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994). 
112 See Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 
457 (6th Cir. 2001) (analyzing cases and observing that “courts have been reluctant to extend the right 
of publicity to depictions of life-stories based on First Amendment considerations”). 
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baseball players’ names in fantasy baseball games.113 Complainant C.B.C., 
a provider of web-based fantasy baseball services, sought declaratory 
judgment that its game-running services did not violate the rights of 
publicity held by Major League Baseball (MLB) players.114 The Eighth 
Circuit held that C.B.C.’s conduct was, under Missouri law, sufficient for a 
prima facie right-of-publicity infringement case.115 But the Eighth Circuit 
used the First Amendment to bar the claim, cutting a large swath out of the 
nominal scope of the right of publicity.116  
The C.B.C. case is interesting as an example of the strained way in 
which Zacchini has been dealt with by lower courts. C.B.C. cited Zacchini 
for the proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court has directed that state law 
rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment 
considerations.”117 It is a peculiar citation, because the Zacchini case did 
not say rights of publicity must be balanced with the First Amendment—
nor, even, is it fair to say the U.S. Supreme Court implied this.118  
Nonetheless, proceeding to the First Amendment balancing it felt 
obliged to do under Zacchini, the C.B.C. court weighed heavily the “public 
value of information about the game of baseball and its players,” referring 
to the “substantial public interest” in the “recitation and discussion of 
factual data concerning the athletic performance of [MLB players].”119 And 
the court gave little weight to economic interests of baseball players, 
observing that “major league baseball players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional 
large sums from endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”120 
Comparing these two sets of interests, the court concluded “CBC’s first 
amendment rights in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the 
players’ rights of publicity.”121  
113 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). Fantasy baseball “allows ordinary people to act as the owner 
and general manager of an imaginary baseball team made up of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
players. . . .” Robert T. Razzano, Intellectual Property and Baseball Statistics: Can Major League 
Baseball Take Its Fantasy Ball and Go Home?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2006). The game works 
by allowing fantasy team owners to draft and trade players, with the winner being determined by 
aggregating statistics from the ballplayer’s real-world statistics. Id. at 1160–61. 
114 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 820. 
115 Id. at 822–23. 
116 Id. at 824. 
117 Id. at 823. 
118 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
119 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 823–24 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
120 Id. at 824. 
121 Id. 
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Viewed exclusively through a First Amendment lens, the C.B.C 
decision is strange when considered alongside other right-of-publicity 
decisions. For instance, a right-of-publicity cause of action has been upheld 
in the cases of celebrity identities being used on buttons, posters, and t-
shirts122—all of which are much more straight-forwardly within the First 
Amendment sphere, being vehicles of viewpoint-bearing communication, 
than the game of fantasy baseball.123 Notably, however, the use of player 
names in fantasy baseball does not fit easily within the categories of 
endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment. 
The same free speech interests upheld by the First Amendment in 
right-of-publicity cases are sometimes pursued under other labels. In 
Minnesota, for instance, the courts recognize a “newsworthiness defense” 
to the right of publicity, which “is akin to a First Amendment privilege and 
arises from the same roots as that privilege.”124 The Minnesota case of 
Dryer v. National Football League held that a former football player’s 
right-of-publicity claim for the use of old film footage in new 
documentary-style television productions was barred by the 
newsworthiness privilege125—notwithstanding that the passage of three or 
four decades would seem to take subject matter out of the category of 
“news.”126 But while an ill fit for newsworthiness, Dryer makes sense as a 
case that involves neither endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual 
impressment.  
New York has recognized a newsworthiness exception as well—and 
has also applied it in surprisingly broad ways. In Stephano v. News Group 
Publications, Inc., a model plaintiff’s right-of-publicity claim was rejected 
where photos for which he posed were used for more than the one article to 
which he had agreed.127 The photo sued over featured the plaintiff modeling 
a bomber jacket. The newsworthiness value of the photo—the jacket had a 
“‘fun fur’ collar” and would be on sale the following week at 
Bloomingdale’s128—seems strained, to say the least. But it does seem clear 
122 See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (posters); Bi-Rite v. Button 
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (buttons); Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 
(Cal. 2001) (t-shirts). These cases are discussed below. See infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text. 
123 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (overturning, on the basis of the First 
Amendment, a criminal conviction of a man for wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in 
a courthouse). 
124 Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1199 (D. Minn. 2014). 
125 Id. 
126 Plaintiff Fred Dryer played football in the NFL from 1969 to 1981. Id. at 1186. 
127 Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 581–82 (N.Y. 1984). 
128 Id. at 582. 
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that as an editorial photo spread as opposed to an ad, the usage tread on 
none of the rights of endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment. 
In the overall calculus, the cases reveal that the right of publicity is not 
merely constrained by free speech interests. The doctrine gets much of its 
essential shape from courts’ habitual use of free-speech-type defenses, 
even as the application of these defenses is often incoherent. 
2. Copyright Preemption.—Another subtrahend that cuts the scope
of the right of publicity down to a tenable size is copyright preemption. 
Compared with the ubiquity of free speech jurisprudence in right-of-
publicity decisions, copyright preemption is more rare.129 Nonetheless, 
copyright preemption seems to play a substantial role as a pressure-relief 
valve for the extreme expansiveness of the right of publicity’s blackletter 
doctrine. The fact is, some claims that are at odds with our right-of-
publicity intuitions do not lend themselves to disposal through a free 
speech defense. 
A brief background on copyright law may be helpful before delving 
into the role of copyright preemption in shaping the right of publicity: 
Copyright provides a monopoly right over original works of authorship.130 
Works of authorship is a broad category.131 It includes books, poems, 
photographs, paintings, sculptures, and other modes of expression of 
natural persons.132 There is no need to apply for a copyright—the copyright 
in a work of authorship arises instantaneously when the work is “fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.”133 That means, for instance, that as 
soon as creative expression is written down on paper, recorded to tape, 
captured on film, or stored digitally by a computer, copyright protection 
commences.  
With the exception of sound recordings made before February 15, 
1972, copyright law in the United States is exclusively federal134 and 
129 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U. CAL. DAVIS
L. REV. 199, 225 (2002) (“[F]ew courts have found that copyright preempts the right of publicity. . . .”). 
130 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (copyright provided for “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
432 (1984). 
131 See § 102(a)(1)–(8). 
132 See, e.g., Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(discussing breadth of subject matter of copyright). 
133 See § 102(a); see also Express, LLC v. Fetish Grp., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) (“[A] copyright exists as soon as the original expression is fixed in a tangible medium.”). 
134 See § 301 (exclusivity of federal law in copyright; excepting sound recordings made before 
February 15, 1972); Holly M. Sharp, Comment, The Day the Music Died: How Overly Extended 
Copyright Terms Threaten the Very Existence of Our Nation’s Earliest Musical Works, 57 EMORY L.J. 
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preempts state law. There is an express preemption provision at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 301.135 In addition, generally applicable theories of federal preemption—
not based on an express statutory provision—would appear to apply to
copyright as well.136 Like other invocations of preemption in litigation,
copyright preemption is an affirmative defense.137
A leading case regarding the application of copyright preemption to a 
right-of-publicity claim is the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 case, Laws v. Sony 
Music Entertainment, Inc.138 The case is particularly interesting because its 
awkward, improbable reasoning regarding preemption demonstrates how 
right of publicity’s doctrinal crisis can put other law under strain. 
The dispute arose out of the 2002 song “All I Have,” recorded by 
Jennifer Lopez and LL Cool J for Epic Records. That song used a sample 
containing the voice of R&B singer Debra Laws, from her 1981 ballad 
“Very Special,” an Elektra Records release.139 Epic’s parent, Sony Music 
Entertainment, obtained a license for the sound-recording sample from 
Warner Special Products, Inc., which acted as agent for Elektra/Asylum 
Records, owner of the sound-recording copyright in “Very Special.”140 But 
although Sony got the license for the sound-recording copyright, Sony did 
not seek permission from Laws to use her voice, nor was Laws 
compensated in any way for Sony’s usage.141 
Based on the use of her voice in “All I Have,” Laws sued Sony for 
common law right-of-publicity misappropriation and misappropriation 
under California’s right-of-publicity statute, Civil Code § 3344.142 Because 
the blackletter scope of the right of publicity is so broad, Laws had a clear-
279, 284–88 (2007) (explaining that copyright law applied to sound recordings made before February 
15, 1972). 
135 § 301. 
136 See Rothman, supra note 129, at 208, 242–43 (discussing the applicability of generally 
applicable preemption theories derived from the Supremacy Clause in the copyright context). 
137 See, e.g., Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 14 C 5704, 2015 WL 350981, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 
2015) (holding that preemption is an affirmative defense in the context of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act of 1995); 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 18:8.50 (2016) 
(noting that copyright preemption is an affirmative defense).  
138 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). 
139 Id. at 1136, 1138, 1143. 
140 Id. at 1136; Shirley Halperin, Who Destroyed Epic Records?, BILLBOARDBIZ (Nov. 17, 2010, 
12:00 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1197460/who-destroyed-epic-records 
[https://perma.cc/P67W-JDN4] (Epic owned by Sony). The Laws court reported that “[t]he agreement 
required Sony to include a credit stating, ‘Featuring samples from the Debra Laws recording “Very 
Special”’ in any reproduction.” Laws, 448 F.3d at 1136. Interestingly, “All I Have,” when purchased 
from iTunes, does not include this credit. (Digital file information on file with author.). 
141 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1136. 
142 Id. 
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cut violation to sue over: There was a commercial exploitation. And it was 
of Laws’ voice, identifiable as Laws’.  
The Laws court declined to say anything about whether a claim had 
been stated. Instead, the opinion skipped straight to the affirmative defense 
of copyright preemption. The court applied a two-part test for preemption 
under 17 U.S.C. § 301, copyright law’s express preemption provision.143 
According to the Laws court, a claim is preempted under § 301 if (1) the 
subject matter of the plaintiff’s right-of-publicity claims comes within the 
subject matter of copyright and (2) the state-law rights asserted by the 
plaintiff are equivalent to those created under the federal copyright 
statute.144 
The court held Laws’ claim preempted. The court’s analysis, 
particularly with regard to the first prong, is largely inscrutable. The court 
seemed to be persuaded by Sony’s argument that “once a voice becomes 
part of a sound recording in a fixed tangible medium it comes within the 
subject matter of copyright law.”145 This cannot be right, however. If this 
were how a court is to construe the subject matter of copyright, then almost 
all right-of-publicity claims would be preempted by copyright.146 All uses 
of voices and likenesses in print, on film, in audio recordings, or affixed to 
any lunch box, coffee mug, or t-shirt would be preempted. To take just one 
example, Zacchini’s claim regarding his human cannonball act would be 
preempted under the Laws logic, since his performance was fixed on 
film.147 In fact, with the exception of perhaps a handful of live-performance 
cases, every right-of-publicity case arising since 1989, when copyright law 
changed so that copyright attaches immediately upon fixation,148 involves 
the plaintiff’s name, likeness, voice, or other indicia of identity being 
incorporated into a copyrighted work. 
In trying to make sense of the Laws court’s work, one might initially 
suspect that what the court was actually talking about is an implied license 
theory—that Laws impliedly licensed her right of publicity as part of her 
recording deal with Elektra. That, however, cannot be the explanation, 
because it was apparently undisputed in the case that Laws had not given 
Elektra a sublicensable right to exploit her voice in the future beyond the 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 1139. 
146 That is, assuming they also meet the second prong of the test. That second prong does not 
winnow the field either, however, as I discuss next. 
147 See supra note 89 and accompanying text regarding the Zacchini case. 
148 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 §§ 7(e), 9(a), 102 Stat. 
2858–59 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 408(a) (2012)) (neither notice nor registration is required). 
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distribution of her own records.149 Thus an implied license theory cannot 
explain the court’s holding.150 
The Laws court strained to distinguish various cases that seem 
incompatible with its holding. A particular problem for the Laws court 
were two Ninth Circuit cases that upheld right-of-publicity claims for 
commercial exploitation of the plaintiff’s voice: one where Bette Midler’s 
voice was imitated in a Ford television advertisement and another where 
Tom Waits’ voice was imitated in a Doritos radio commercial.151 The Laws 
court distinguished both on the basis that the voices were imitated, rather 
than copied verbatim.152 The court’s implication was that the imitated 
voices were not the subject of copyright. Yet in both Midler and Waits, the 
imitation voices were fixed in the sound recording for the advertisement, 
and as such, they were then within the subject matter of copyright—at least 
as the Laws court had construed the concept.  
Another case that would seem to be incompatible with the Laws 
holding was Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.153 There, the Seventh Circuit held 
that model June Toney’s right-of-publicity claim was not preempted by 
copyright where she sued the L’Oreal cosmetics company for using her 
image in advertising and on packaging after the expiration of L’Oreal’s 
endorsement deal with Toney.154 The Laws court clumsily attempted to 
distinguish Toney on the grounds that the defendants in that case had each, 
at some point, owned the copyright to the photo bearing the plaintiff’s 
likeness.155 By contrast, Sony had only licensed the “Very Special” sound 
recording, not owned it outright.156 This logic, if taken seriously, would 
have bizarre implications. For one, it would mean that copyright licensees 
have a greater ability to exploit a copyrighted work than the copyright 
owner does.  
149 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1143–44. 
150 An additional reason the implied license theory does not greatly help explain the court’s holding 
is that implied license is its own robust defense to right-of-publicity infringement. So, a court wanting 
to invoke the implied-license concept could do so straightforwardly, without engaging the issue of 
copyright preemption. 
151 Those cases are Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a pre-
emption argument to uphold a right-of-publicity claim based on the imitation of Bette Midler’s voice in 
a Ford commercial) and Waits v. Frito–Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding claim 
for the imitation of musician Tom Waits’ voice in a Doritos commercial). 
152 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1140–41. 
153 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005). 
154 Id. at 908–10. 
155 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1142. 
156 See id. 
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While the Laws case is impossible to make sense of on its own terms, 
its result, along with the results of the cases it sought to distinguish, 
conforms without difficulty to a three-rights framework view of the right of 
publicity. Midler, Waits, and Toney were each endorsement cases, thus a 
right-of-publicity cause of action was upheld, notwithstanding the specter 
of copyright preemption. The usage in Laws, however, does not fit as 
endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment.157  
Many cases have followed the illogic of Laws in using copyright 
preemption against right-of-publicity claims. And they can be reconciled in 
the same way. In Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., a 2010 case, 
plaintiff Ken Aronson took video of himself and a friend during a trip to 
England.158 When the video was used in Michael Moore’s feature-film 
documentary Sicko, Aronson sued for copyright infringement and right-of-
publicity infringement. The court held his right-of-publicity claim was 
preempted by copyright since his voice and image were fixed in a 
copyrighted videotape.159 In another 2010 case, Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 
144942 Canada Inc., an adult film performer, director, and producer sued 
for right-of-publicity infringement over the unauthorized distribution and 
marketing of films he had made and performed in.160 The court held that his 
claim was preempted by copyright because the subject of the alleged 
misappropriation was “contained within a copyrighted medium.”161 In Ray 
v. ESPN, Inc., a 2014 Missouri case, Steve “Wild Thing” Ray, a former
professional wrestler, sued over television network ESPN’s use of film
clips that depicted him in the ring.162 The court in Ray followed Laws in
holding that since Ray’s likeness was contained within a copyrighted film,
it was preempted by copyright.163 The most sensible explanation for the
maladroit reasoning in these cases is that the right of publicity’s stated
blackletter scope is erroneously broad, and the right of publicity does not,
in fact, generally create liability for commercial exploitation of indicia of
identity of natural persons. Commercial use of a person’s identity in
advertising does—as in the Midler, Waits, and Toney cases. But the
gravamina of the other cases fail to fit within the advertising/endorsement
ambit or within the scope of merchandizing or virtual impressment.
157 The closest would be virtual impressment, a right-of-publicity species implicitly recognized by 
at least some courts. See infra Section III.C.  
158 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
159 See id. at 1114–16. 
160 617 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2010). 
161 Id. at 1153 (quoting Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141). 
162 No. 13–1179–CV–W–SOW, 2014 WL 2766187, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d 
1140 (8th Cir. 2015). 
163 Id. at *5. 
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So, in the end, Laws and the cases following it got to the right result, 
but copyright preemption did not have—and logically could not have 
had—anything to do with it. 
There is an alternative way, proposed by David Nimmer, to try to 
make sense of the work of the courts on copyright preemption and the right 
of publicity. But the approach is ultimately unconvincing. Nimmer’s 
suggestion is that when a use of a person’s identity is in an advertisement 
or is otherwise “for purposes of trade,” then it is not preempted, whereas if 
it is for “expressive works,” then a right-of-publicity claim is preempted.164 
The first problem with this view is that, as far as copyright is concerned, 
advertisements are expressive works, and in terms of what is protectable, 
copyright does not draw a distinction between advertisements and works 
with a higher “expressive” value.165 Copyright, in fact, famously refuses to 
draw a distinction between works on the basis of low or high artistic 
value.166 If copyright does not observe such a distinction in terms of 
protectability, why should it in terms of preemption? The second, more 
general problem with Nimmer’s view is that it is needlessly ad hoc and 
complex, as Nimmer’s theory ultimately takes the form of an exception to 
an exception. The more cogent explanation is simply that the right of 
publicity itself does not extend liability to portrayals in non-advertising, 
non-merchandizing, non-virtual-impressment contexts.  
3. Other Subtrahends.—Beyond the application of free speech rights
and copyright preemption, there are other means occasionally employed by 
the courts to avoid allowing plaintiffs to proceed where a right-of-publicity 
claim, though supported by the nominal blackletter doctrine, is nonetheless 
at odds with judicial intuition.  
Many courts have applied an “incidental use” exception to the right of 
publicity. For instance, in Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc.,167 a court 
in New Mexico cited “incidental use” in granting summary judgment for a 
defendant publisher who used a photograph of the plaintiff in an article 
about the photographer.168 The Benally use is one that would fail to 
164 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I] 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029–30 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (discussing Nimmer’s theory). 
165 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (holding that 
advertisements are protected by copyright). 
166 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only [in] the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of 
the narrowest and most obvious limits.” See id. at 251. 
167 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1988). 
168 Id. at 979. The court’s analysis appears to arise from misconstruing the Restatement’s mention 
of “incidental.” 
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establish a prima facie case under the three-rights view of the right of 
publicity.  
Other courts seem to have selectively ignored the law or facts—a 
phenomenon that one could call “judge nullification” or “bench 
nullification.”169  
An example of selectively ignoring the law can be found in Landham 
v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.170 Actor Sonny Landham sued a toy company
under Kentucky law over his apparent depiction in the form of an action
figure for Billy—a camo-clad, machine-gun-wielding operative whom
Landham portrayed in the 1987 movie Predator alongside Arnold
Schwarzenegger.171 The court affirmed summary judgment against the
plaintiff’s statutory right-of-publicity cause of action on the basis that the
identity of the plaintiff, whom the court derided as a “fringe actor”172 was
not shown to have “significant commercial value.”173 In support of its
assertion that the law required this showing, the court cited common law
cases not considering the Kentucky statute.174 Yet Kentucky’s statute very
clearly has no requirement that a person be a celebrity or that her or his
identity have significant commercial value.175
An example of spuriously characterizing the facts of a case to avoid 
right-of-publicity liability can be found in Polydoros v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp.,176 in which the California Court of Appeal considered a 
right-of-publicity claim177 brought against a studio for the film The 
Sandlot.178  
169 With this phrasing, I mean to draw an analogy to jury nullification. The phrase “judge 
nullification” has been employed sporadically in the past. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing 
Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 831 & n.213 (1997) (using 
the phrase to describe judge’s departure from doctrine in certain scientifically complex cases where 
fairness concerns sided with plaintiffs in toxic tort cases). I thank Greg Gordon for suggesting the 
phrase “bench nullification.” 
170 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000). 
171 Id. at 621; PREDATOR (1987), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093773/ [https://perma.cc/
2SMN-C8XV]. 
172 Landham, 227 F.3d at 621. 
173 Id. at 624. 
174 Id. 
175 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (2017) (“The General Assembly recognizes that a person 
has property rights in his name and likeness which are entitled to protection from commercial 
exploitation.”). Confirming the plain language of the statute is a separate provision that provides for a 
fifty-year post-mortem right for a person who is a “public figure.” Id. § 391.170(2). 
176 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
177 The court generally referred to the plaintiff’s common law claim as one for “invasion of 
privacy” or “commercial appropriation.” Id. at 208. 
178 Id. 
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In the movie, a “comedic coming-of-age story set in . . . the 1960’s,”179 
a new kid moves into a San Fernando, California neighborhood and tries to 
fit in by joining the local sandlot baseball team.180 Hijinks ensue. The film 
was well received by many. Famed film critic Roger Ebert gushed about 
the absorbing world created by the movie.181 Ironically, Ebert also wrote 
that the film doesn’t have “any connection with the humdrum reality of the 
boring real world,” and he saluted its ability to “tap directly into a vein of 
nostalgia and memory that makes reality seem puny by comparison.”182 
Contrary to how Ebert saw it, plaintiff Michael Polydoros perceived a 
very tight connection between the movie and real life. In particular, 
Michael Polydoros thought his resemblance to the film’s “Michael 
Palledorous” character was no coincidence.183 Polydoros had a number of 
compelling facts on this score. Both the plaintiff and the character grew up 
in a similar neighborhood in the early 1960s.184 Both the plaintiff and the 
character played sandlot baseball with friends.185 Both swam in a 
community pool.186 Moreover, as the court acknowledged, “A photograph 
of [the plaintiff] dating from the 1960’s is similar to a photograph of the 
Palledorous character in the movie, right down to appellant’s eyeglasses 
and the color and design of his shirt.”187 The character and the plaintiff also 
shared the characteristic—according to the court—of being “somewhat 
obstreperous.”188  
Given these compelling similarities between The Sandlot’s world and 
the real world, it will come as no surprise that writer–director David 
Mickey Evans and the plaintiff were schoolmates when growing up.189  
Overall, the undisputed facts clearly showed that Polydoros’ name, 
identity, and likeness had been appropriated. In terms of alleging a prima 
facie case under the blackletter law, Polydoros had it made. Under 
179 Id. 
180 See Roger Ebert, The Sandlot, ROGEREBERT.COM (Apr. 7, 1993), http://www.rogerebert.com/
reviews/the-sandlot-1993 [https://perma.cc/ L6X3-GLUN]. 
181 Ebert explained what happened when one character hit a line drive: “I ducked and held up my 
mitt, and then I realized I didn’t have a mitt, and it was then I also realized how completely this movie 
had seduced me with its memories of what really matters when you are 12.” Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 208. It is not clear from the case whether there was any difference in 
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California common law, “an individual’s right to publicity is invaded if 
another appropriates for his advantage the individual’s name, image, 
identity or likeness.”190 It cannot seriously be disputed that Polydoros had 
proved his case by this standard. Yet the intuitive result would be that no 
right-of-publicity violation should lie. 
The Polydoros court could have confronted head-on the 
uncomfortable breadth of the blackletter law and its failure to conform to a 
collective intuition about the right of publicity. It did not. Instead, the court 
proceeded to boldly draw one implausible factual inference after another 
until it reached the result that made intuitive sense.191  
The court explained “there was a marked difference in age and 
appearance between our appellant, the 40-year-old Michael Polydoros, and 
the 10-year-old character of Squints Palledorous.”192 The court said this 
notwithstanding that the film portrayed events happening thirty years 
earlier.193 “No person seeing this film could confuse the two,”194 the court 
then asserted—a conclusion belied by, among other things, the court’s 
mention that after the movie people had begun calling the plaintiff by the 
movie character’s nickname, “Squints.”195  
As with preposterously reasoned cases using the banner of the First 
Amendment or copyright preemption, the result of Polydoros can be 
justified with reference to a particularized depiction of the right of publicity 
as three distinct rights: the studio’s use of Polydoros’ indicia of identity 
was neither for endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual impressment. 
190 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
191 The Polydoros opinion’s factual analysis is reminiscent of the “Jedi mind trick.” In the original 
Star Wars movie, sage hero and Jedi knight Obi-Wan Kenobi, traveling with Luke Skywalker and two 
fugitive droids, is stopped by stormtroopers of the evil Empire. Waiving his hand and speaking in a 
soothing voice, Obi-Wan says to the stormtroopers, “These are not the droids you’re looking for.” 
Mesmerized, the lead stormtrooper announces, “These are not the droids we’re looking for.” 
Radio9704, These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking for. . ., YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=532j-186xEQ [https://perma.cc/A8DN-V4FU]; see also Jillian 
Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 L. & SEXUALITY 
123, 132 n.26 (2001) (referencing the scene in analogy to avoiding questions of gender identity); Anne 
E. Mullins, Jedi or Judge: How the Human Mind Redefines Judicial Opinions, 16 WYO. L. REV. 325,
325–26 (2016) (referencing the scene in discussing how the persuasiveness of judicial writing can work
on an unconscious level).
192 Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). In this, the court cited to Aguilar v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), which made a similar move with 
regard to the plaintiff’s age.  
193 Downplaying the similarity of names—Michael Polydoros and Michael Palledorous—notice 
that the court replaced the character name “Michael” with “Squints,” which was the character’s 
nickname. Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 208. 
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III. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING ONE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS THREE
If right-of-publicity issues are to become more predictable and better
moored in sound policy and theory, we need to define the right of publicity 
positively. We must be able to say what it is, not merely what it is not. That 
is the aim of this Part, to build a positively-described picture of the right of 
publicity—self-limited, such that it does not require free speech defenses, 
copyright preemption, or other exceptions to give it its essential shape.  
To do this, I divide the right of publicity into three separate rights: (1) 
the endorsement right, (2) the merchandizing entitlement, and (3) the right 
against virtual impressment. For clarity in developing the law going 
forward, it would be best for courts to regard the violation of each to be a 
distinct cause of action. 
A couple of caveats. First, in attempting to delineate these three rights, 
I mean to take no normative position on any of them. It is my intent to 
leave entirely open the question of whether judicial or statutory recognition 
of any of them is sound policy. My aim, instead, is to bring analytical 
clarity to thinking about the law in this area by providing a structure that 
imposes some meaningful order on the tangle of cases that currently are 
found under the banner of the right of publicity. In fact, far from seeking to 
champion or to oppose any of these rights, it is my hope that bringing some 
clarity to the doctrine might enable a more productive and focused debate 
on whether their legal recognition is a good idea.  
Second, although this may be obvious, I wish to point out that I am 
not making the claim that every single right-of-publicity case corresponds 
with this three-rights schema. Rather, I assert that the three-rights approach 
shows strong general correspondence to the results of cases, and viewing 
cases through the three-rights lens reveals a great deal of coherence and 
uniformity. Cases that do not conform might, of course, be thought of as 
erroneous. Alternatively, they might be seen as purposefully nonadherent, 
either seeking deliberately to recognize new areas of exclusive rights, or 
interposing principled objections to a relatively new legal entitlement 
whose wisdom remains very much a live issue. 
A. The Endorsement Right
The right of publicity has been consistently invoked with success 
where the plaintiff has been unwittingly contrived to endorse commercial 
goods or services. To sum up the corresponding right in a Restatement-
style manner: 
Persons have a right not to be represented as making a commercial 
endorsement or to appear in an advertisement in such a way that suggests 
endorsement absent their specific consent. An identifiable use of a person in 
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advertising for a product or service or on product packaging is generally a 
violation.  
In terms of the dignitary and reputational interests the endorsement 
right protects, it shows a marked kinship with defamation, false light, 
common law trademark, and the Lanham Act.196  
The right not to be portrayed as endorsing a commercial enterprise 
applies regardless of whether the person actually uses or recommends that 
product.197 Thus, it would be a violation of the endorsement right for a boot 
manufacturer to distribute an advertisement with a photo identifiably 
depicting the plaintiff where the photo has been digitally altered to make it 
appear that the plaintiff was wearing the defendant’s brand of boots, when, 
in fact, the plaintiff was not actually wearing those boots. But it also would 
be a violation of the endorsement right to use in an advertisement an 
unaltered photo identifiably depicting a person wearing the defendant’s 
boots, even when that person actually wore the defendant’s boots.  
The existence of this endorsement right is well-supported by case law 
in many jurisdictions. One of the earliest uses of a right-of-publicity-type 
claim was for endorsement.198 In the 1905 case of Pavesich v. New England 
Life Insurance Co., the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a cause of 
action for “the publication of one’s picture without his consent by another, 
as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and 
gains of the advertiser.”199 A picture of the plaintiff was used in a 
newspaper ad for life insurance, attributing to him the entirely fictional 
sentiment that he was glad he purchased insurance during the “healthy and 
productive period” of his life.200 The plaintiff’s picture was juxtaposed with 
a picture of a sickly looking man said to regret that he had not purchased 
insurance when he could have.201 
196 In fact, the action for false endorsement under the Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) has considerable 
overlap, but the right of publicity’s endorsement/advertising liability is substantially broader. See, e.g., 
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that to make out a false 
endorsement case under § 43(a), “a plaintiff must show that: (1) its mark is legally protectable; (2) it 
owns the mark; and (3) the defendant’s use of the mark to identify its goods or services is likely to 
create confusion concerning the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of those goods or services”). 
197 See Madow, supra note 2, at 231 (observing that the right of publicity can be used to enjoin 
truthful representations about the association of a given celebrity and a given product). 
198 Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
199 Id. Note that the court labeled the claim an invasion of the “right of privacy.” Id. at 69. The 
court also, however, obliquely referenced a “right of publicity.” Id. at 70. 
200 Id. at 68–69. 
201 Id. 
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The recognized birth-case of the right of publicity, Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,202 also acknowledged the 
essence of the endorsement right by specifying that the right of publicity is 
a means of allowing people to “receive[] money for authorizing 
advertisements.”203 
Many of the best-known right-of-publicity cases have been 
endorsement-right cases. For instance, the 1974 Ninth Circuit case of 
Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. upheld a right-of-publicity 
cause of action for a magazine advertisement for Winston cigarettes.204 The 
court characterized the claim as concerning “the alleged misappropriation 
of [the plaintiff’s] name, likeness, personality, and endorsement.”205 
Right-of-publicity cases that deal with endorsement rights may not 
explicitly categorize themselves as such. In the 2001 case Downing v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch, the Ninth Circuit upheld a right-of-publicity cause of 
action brought by famed surfers against a trendy clothing retailer for their 
depiction in a photograph used in an endorsement context.206 The plaintiff’s 
photo appeared in a print publication, Abercrombie & Fitch Quarterly, that 
was styled as a magazine but which functioned in essence as a catalog to 
which one subscribed.207 The right-of-publicity claim in the case was 
analyzed without any reference to endorsement being the crux of the 
action.208 Yet the importance of the endorsement aspect of the case can be 
discerned in other ways. For one, the endorsement aspect was central to the 
court’s analysis of the surfers’ Lanham Act § 43(a)209 claim for “confusion 
and deception indicating sponsorship of Abercrombie goods.”210 That 
discussion centered on whether consumers were likely to be confused in 
thinking that the plaintiff surfers had endorsed Abercrombie & Fitch.211 The 
court concluded that “[a]ppellants have raised a genuine issue of material 
fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to their endorsement”; thus the 
202 202 F.2d 866, 866 (2d Cir. 1953). For the full discussion of this case, see supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
203 Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
204 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
205 Id. at 822 (italics added). 
206 265 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001). 
207 See id. at 999. 
208 See id. at 1001–03. 
209 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
210 Downing, 265 F.3d at 999. The Lanham Act § 43(a) claim analysis is found at 265 F.3d at 
1007–09. 
211 See id. at 1009. 
111:891 (2017) Right to Publicity 
931 
court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 43(a) claim on 
summary judgment.212  
The Downing court’s concern with endorsement can also be discerned, 
at least implicitly, in its rejection of Abercrombie & Fitch’s First 
Amendment defense to the right-of-publicity claim. Although the 
photograph of the plaintiff surfers was used in combination with a 
journalistic-style story about surfing,213 the court rejected, not very 
plausibly, the idea that the photos had editorial value,214 saying the photos 
“d[id] not contribute significantly to a matter of the public interest.”215 
Strangely, the court’s ad hoc constitutional analysis did not draw at all on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s teachings on First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech in reaching its result. The court’s short shrift with the 
First Amendment suggests that the analysis was not, in substance, about 
rejecting constitutional concerns, but about separating this case, as an 
endorsement-right case, from cases where an endorsement was not part of 
the allegations. 
The existence of the endorsement right finds support, as well, in the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement of Unfair Competition.216 It should 
be noted that, like other blackletter pronouncements about the right of 
publicity, the Restatement’s description is overbroad. Yet the Restatement 
does specify that embraced within its conception of the right of publicity 
are situations in which a person’s identity is “used in advertising the user’s 
goods or services.”217 
212 Id. at 1010. 
213 Id. at 1000 (“The Spring 1999 Quarterly, ‘Spring Fever,’ contains a section entitled ‘Surf 
Nekkid.’ The ‘Surf Nekkid’ section includes an article recounting the history of surfing. Abercrombie 
also included a 700-word story, entitled ‘Your Beach Should Be This Cool,’ describing the history of 
Old Man’s Beach at San Onofre, California. The following page exhibits the photograph of Appellants. 
The two pages immediately thereafter feature [clothing for sale].”). 
214 Id. at 1002–03. (“In the current action, there is a tenuous relationship between Appellants’ 
photograph and the theme presented. Abercrombie used Appellants’ photograph essentially as window-
dressing to advance the catalog’s surf-theme. The catalog did not explain that Appellants were legends 
of the sport and did not in any way connect Appellants with the story preceding it. In fact, the catalog 
incorrectly identifies where and when the photograph was taken. We conclude that the illustrative use 
of Appellants’ photograph does not contribute significantly to a matter of the public interest and that 
Abercrombie cannot avail itself of the First Amendment defense. Accordingly, we reverse the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie.”). 
215 Id. at 1002. 
216 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–47 (1995). 
217 See id. § 46 (“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using 
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject 
to liability . . . .”); id. § 47 (“The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used ‘for 
purposes of trade’ under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in advertising the user’s goods or 
services . . . .”). 
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The Restatement’s use of the word “advertising” brings up an 
important clarifying point. Despite speaking of “use[] in advertising” rather 
than “endorsement,” the Restatement nonetheless seems to be getting at the 
endorsement concept. But the terms “advertising” and “endorsement” are 
not equivalent. The word “advertising” does not get at the essence of the 
matter. There are uses in advertising that would not imply an endorsement, 
and which, correspondingly, are not right-of-publicity violations. For 
instance, there is no implied endorsement in using a person’s identity in 
advertising for a motion picture where that person is a subject of the motion 
picture. The same would be true of advertising for a television news 
program or an unauthorized biographical book about a person. Indeed, the 
Restatement recognizes this, but it does so in a doctrinally inverted way, 
saying that the scope of the right of publicity “does not ordinarily include 
the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary, 
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is 
incidental to such uses.”218 
B. The Merchandizing Entitlement
Along with endorsement cases, right-of-publicity actions are also 
routinely successful where a person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity is used in merchandizing219—placing a recognizable symbol (name, 
likeness, etc.) on a product to propel the sale of that product.220  
With merchandizing, the consumer is generally buying the product—
coffee mug, t-shirt, key chain, lunch box, etc.—because of the symbol and 
its message-carrying capacity; frequently the merchandise is a means of 
displaying cultural affinity.221 The product’s functional utility is secondary. 
Such goods are often called “merch.” 
The merchandizing entitlement can be summed up in a simple 
statement as follows: 
Persons have the exclusive privilege to exploit their name and likeness in 
merchandizing. 
218 Id. § 47. 
219 The terms “merchandise” and “merchandizing” are used variably in business. I use these terms 
in a particular senses, as I explain.  
220 Cf. Jennifer A. Konefal, Note, Dastar: Federal Trademark Law in an Uncertain State, 11 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 283, 298 n.130 (2005) (“[M]erchandising can be defined for purposes of this paper as
‘licensing publicly recognizable properties for use on or in association with specific products or
services to foster their sale.’”) (citation omitted).
221 See Madow, supra note 2, at 128–29 (noting that “celebrities haul . . . semiotic freight” and that 
“there is a large and increasingly lucrative market for merchandise (T-shirts, posters, greeting cards, 
buttons, party favors, coffee mugs, school notebooks, dolls, and so on) bearing the names, faces, or 
other identifying characteristics of celebrities, living and dead”). 
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In terms of the interests it protects, the merchandizing entitlement has 
a strong kinship with copyright and design patent. It is, in other words, 
much more intellectual-property-like than the endorsement right, which is 
more tort-like in nature. 
The case that is generally considered the first right-of-publicity case, 
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., is best understood 
as a merchandizing-entitlement case.222 The merchandise there was baseball 
cards. Moreover, the case is known for recognizing a property-type aspect 
in the right of publicity, a point which distinguished Haelan from the more 
tort-oriented cases that came before it.223 Many merchandizing-entitlement-
type right-of-publicity cases have followed. They include: Bi-Rite 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, a successful suit by Pat Benatar and 
other musical artists to stop the unlicensed distribution of buttons bearing 
their names and photos;224 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., a successful 
suit by a holding company of the Elvis Presley estate against the distributor 
of “memorial” posters after the singer’s death;225 Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a successful suit by the Three Stooges holding 
company against an artist who sold lithographs and t-shirts bearing his 
sketch of Larry, Curly, and Moe;226 and Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., a successful suit 
by the slain civil rights leader’s rights-holding organization against the 
seller of memorial busts.227 These cases are all regarded by the courts as 
standard right-of-publicity cases. 
The centrality of the merchandizing aspect in these cases can be 
perceived when we compare successful merchandizing cases to certain 
cases where the courts rejected a right-of-publicity claim. For instance, the 
merchandizing essence of Haelan is made more clear by comparing it to 
another baseball card case that came along decades later, Cardtoons, L.C. 
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n.228 In the 1996 Cardtoons case, the
Tenth Circuit rejected a right-of-publicity claim, and the case can be read
as doing so precisely because these particular cards—parody cards that
222 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
223 Whether the right-of-publicity cause of action is better understood as sounding in tort or being a 
species of intellectual property is a long-running question in right-of-publicity cases and commentary. 
For a discussion, see supra Part I, particularly supra notes 14, 34 and accompanying text. 
224 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
225 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). 
226 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
227 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
228 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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lampooned famous ballplayers—were not player merchandise.229 The court 
did not say this expressly, but it bound up the merchandizing question with 
its First Amendment analysis, brushing off the players’ characterization of 
the cards as merchandise and simultaneously upholding the paramount 
importance of the defendant’s free speech interests.  
The disposition of the Cardtoons case would have been simplified—
and would have avoided the need to bring the First Amendment to bear—if 
it had simply asked whether the parody baseball cards were player 
merchandise, a question that would have been easily answered no.  
Surveying the merchandizing cases shows that where the use of the 
plaintiffs’ name or likeness is what would be considered a merchandizing 
use, then First Amendment and copyright preemption defenses fail.230 On 
the other hand, where First Amendment or copyright preemption defenses 
succeed with likeness-bearing products, it seems to coincide with a 
determination that the product somehow rose above the level of mere 
merchandise to constitute art.231 
C. The Right Against Virtual Impressment
Beyond the endorsement right and the merchandizing entitlement, 
there is a third constellation of right-of-publicity cases—arising in at least 
some courts, albeit infrequently. I will call this cluster “virtual 
impressment.”232 In proceeding to speak of a “right against virtual 
impressment,” I do not mean to make a declaration of its existence and 
229 Id. at 971 (“Cardtoons’ expression requires use of player identities because, in addition to 
parodying the institution of baseball, the cards also lampoon individual players. Further, Cardtoons’ use 
of the trading card format is an essential component of the parody because baseball cards have 
traditionally been used to celebrate baseball players and their accomplishments.”). 
230 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811 (rejecting a First Amendment defense because 
use of the Three Stooges likenesses was not sufficiently “transformative”). See generally supra Sections 
II.D.1–2 (discussing the First Amendment and copyright preemption). 
231 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 919, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
First Amendment defense for depictions of Tiger Woods in what the court characterized not as posters, 
but as serigraphs and lithographs, which were priced at $700 and $100, respectively). 
232 Other names could include “unwitting employment,” “unwitting performance,” “virtual 
conscription,” “virtual servitude,” or the like. Yet another name might be “unfair exploitation,” which 
hints at the underlying unjust enrichment essence of the claim. But that label seems too embracing of 
unrelated situations. Another term, used by some scholars, is "virtual kidnapping." See, e.g., Peter 
Johnson, Can You Quote Donald Duck?: Intellectual Property in Cyberculture, 13 YALE J.L. & 
HUMANITIES 451, 480 (2001). That term, however, has also been used to denote a criminal ransom 
demand based on a kidnapping that has not actually occurred. See, e.g., Samantha Kenney, Regional 
Shortcomings and Global Solutions: Kidnap, Ransom and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 557, 569 (2008). 
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validity.233 Rather, my aim is to make sense of a cluster of cases that have 
evident coherence, even if they are comparatively rare birds. To be precise, 
my claim is that there is a line of cases from some jurisdictions that can be 
explained as producing outcomes as if such a right exists. 
At the broadest level of generality, this virtual-impressment species of 
right-of-publicity violation involves some kind of simulated or constructive 
enlistment of the plaintiff to provide a performance that, at least in the 
absence of enabling technology or a skilled impersonator, would require 
hiring the plaintiff. Here is a concise statement: 
Persons may recover from another who exploits their name, likeness, or voice 
in such a way that they have been unwittingly employed to produce a 
performance that might otherwise require voluntarily supplied labor. 
In terms of the interests it vindicates, the action for virtual 
impressment has kinship with unjust enrichment. It is notably not 
copyright- or patent-like, as the merchandizing entitlement is. And it is not 
tort-like, as the endorsement right is. Rather, the action for virtual 
impressment can be seen as the law imposing itself to reverse what is 
understood to be a windfall.  
The action for virtual impressment is notably distinct from 
merchandizing-entitlement and endorsement-right cases in the occupation 
of the defendant. With merchandizing or endorsement cases, the plaintiff 
and defendant are generally in different industries. The plaintiff might be a 
famous actor while the defendant is a seller of coffee mugs. The battle is 
one of an entertainment-sector plaintiff versus a hard-goods manufacturer. 
In actions for virtual impressment, however, it is common to see a plaintiff 
and defendant both from the entertainment sector. 
The most straightforward instance of this kind of right-of-publicity 
claim would be where a film celebrity is digitally modeled and inserted into 
a film, so that the actor’s performance is included within the film even 
though the actor was not on set and rendered no real-world performance. 
This has been called “digitalcasting”234 and “digital reanimation.”235 While 
generally unexplored by the courts, the subject of digitally created 
233 Given the sparsity of virtual-impressment-type cases that have accumulated at this point, 
making such a declaration is a task that should be left to a court or legislature.  
234 See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 389 n.21 (1999) (discussing “digitalcasting”).
235 See e.g., Thomas Glenn Martin Jr., Comment, Rebirth and Rejuvenation in a Digital
Hollywood: The Challenge Computer-Simulated Celebrities Present for California’s Antiquated Right 
of Publicity, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 99, 127 (1996) (referring to “digital reanimation” as “digitally 
recreat[ing] live actors with no appreciable difference in likeness, voice, or acting quality [and] digitally 
resurrect[ing] deceased celebrities”).  
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performances has received considerable attention in the literature, with 
commentators finding right-of-publicity law relevant, if less than clear, as 
to the extent to which such depictions might be actionable.236 
A virtual-impressment fact scenario that has been explored in the 
courts is the depiction of real persons in videogames. Claims in this factual 
context have generally been successful in a series of cases concerning 
college athletes’ depictions in video games that simulate the team identities 
and rosters for a given sport in a given year. In Hart v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc., Ryan Hart, former quarterback for Rutgers University, sued Electronic 
Arts (EA), the maker of the NCAA Football videogame series.237 The 
district court held that First Amendment interests outweighed Hart’s right-
of-publicity claim, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that EA’s use of 
player identities for game avatars was not transformative enough for First 
Amendment protection.238  
In a separate NCAA/EA sports videogame case, In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation239—decided a few weeks 
after Hart—the Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment defense, 
similarly citing a lack of transformativeness.240 Subsequently, EA settled 
class-action claims in the suit with a payment to athletes of up to $40 
million ($4,000 each for 100,000 athletes) for their videogame 
depictions.241 
In a third videogame case, No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,242 
members of the band No Doubt were successful with a right-of-publicity 
claim against videogame publisher Activision for their unauthorized 
depiction in the videogame Band Hero, which allowed players to cause the 
236 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 184 (2005) (acknowledging the relevance of right-of-
publicity doctrine to digitally simulated performance); Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight 
Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1165, 1174, 1187 (2001) (characterizing a digitally created virtual performance of a real entertainer
as a right-of-publicity issue); Shannon Flynn Smith, If It Looks Like Tupac, Walks Like Tupac, and
Raps Like Tupac, It’s Probably Tupac: Virtual Cloning and Postmortem Right-of-Publicity
Implications, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1719, 1761 (arguing that law is needed to protect against post-
mortem digitally created virtual performance). 
237 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013). 
238 Id. at 147, 167–68. 
239 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
240 Id. at 1284. 
241 See Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M, ESPN (May 31, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-reach-40-million-settlement-ea-sports-
ncaa-licensing-arm [https://perma.cc/R2Q7-NA7C]. The settlement was part of the O’Bannon v. NCAA 
antitrust litigation. Id. 
242 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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No Doubt avatars to perform not only No Doubt songs, but songs by other 
bands as well.243 
An even lower-tech kind of virtual impressment situation involves 
people functioning as impersonators. An early case in this vein is Estate of 
Presley v. Russen from 1981.244 In that case, a New Jersey federal district 
court issued a preliminary injunction against Rob Russen, producer of The 
Big El Show,245 “a live theatrical presentation or concert designed to imitate 
a performance of the late Elvis Presley[, which] stars an individual who 
closely resembles Presley and who imitates the appearance, dress, and 
characteristic performing style of Elvis Presley.”246 
The court was aware the case was distinct from the endorsement and 
merchandizing cases that characterize most of the right-of-publicity 
landscape.247 Yet the court was persuaded a right-of-publicity claim should 
lie in the simulated live performance context.  
Invoking an unjust enrichment type of rationale, the court 
characterized the question in the case as: “[W]hether the use of the likeness 
of a famous deceased entertainer in a performance mainly designed to 
imitate that famous entertainer’s own past stage performances is to be 
considered primarily as a commercial appropriation . . . of the famous 
entertainer’s likeness or as a valuable contribution of information or 
culture.”248  
The court answered that question by concluding that “the show serves 
primarily to commercially exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without 
contributing anything of substantial value to society.”249 
Some courts have followed Russen in finding liability in connection 
with musical impersonator concerts, including impersonations of the 
Beatles.250 But one cannot say right-of-publicity liability for live-
243 Id. at 402, 411 (denying an anti-SLAPP motion to strike on right of publicity claim and 
specifically rejecting Activision’s asserted First Amendment defense). 
244 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
245 Id. at 1348. 
246 Id. at 1359 (footnote omitted). 
247 Id. at 1358 (acknowledging that “most of those cases finding that the right of publicity, or its 
equivalence, prevails have involved the use of a famous name or likeness predominantly in connection 
with the sale of consumer merchandise or solely for purposes of trade—e.g., merely to attract 
attention”) (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
248 Id. at 1359. 
249 Id. (footnote omitted). 
250 See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 344, 349–50 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) 
(right-of-publicity claim for advertising and marketing of performances, if not the performances 
themselves, of Beatles impersonator group “1964 at the Beatles”); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C 
299149, 1986 WL 215081, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 1986) (liability under New York law for 
Beatles impersonators’ Beatlemania show). 
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performance has attained anything approaching a majority view. Notably, 
Nevada’s right-of-publicity statute expressly exempts “an attempt to 
portray, imitate, simulate or impersonate a person in a live performance” 
from liability.251 Nevada’s exemption clearly has special relevance for Las 
Vegas stage productions, where one can see impersonators performing as 
Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis, Jr., Madonna, and Elton John.252 Even the 
Beatles have been recreated at the Planet Hollywood Hotel & Casino.253 
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I want to suggest some implications of the three-rights 
view of the right of publicity. As I have stressed, my aim in this Article is 
not to argue either in favor or against any of the three rights I have 
delineated.254 My aim, instead, is to provide a way of talking about right-of-
publicity law with greater clarity. Thus, I think the most salient 
consequence of understanding the right of publicity as three specifically 
delimited rights, rather than as one amorphous one, is to see that courts can 
reach desired results without engaging in tortured machinations of the law 
or facts.255  
As to other implications, in this Part, I explore how the three-rights 
view can lay the groundwork for a more fine-grained debate over theory, 
and I suggest that the tripartite formulation may be of use to courts and 
legislatures asked to make new recognitions of a cause of action in the 
publicity-rights arena.  
A. Theoretical Distinctions
Many theories have been offered to justify the right of publicity. 
Notably, these theories appear to map differently onto each of the three 
rights described in this Article. I will not attempt to comprehensively 
theorize each of the three rights, but I will provide a couple of examples of 
how theory seems to apply to the rights differentially.  
251 NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790(2)(b) (2016). 
252 See Georgi Schultz, Guide to Las Vegas Impersonator Shows, SHOWTICKETS.COM (Feb. 19, 
2015), http://lasvegas.showtickets.com/articles/top-las-vegas-impersonator-shows-guide/ [https://
perma.cc/4NHV-C63S]; see also Laura Hock, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire 
O.J. Simpson’s Right of Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 347, 360 
n.60 (2008) (opining that “exclusion is no doubt due to the large number of shows occurring each year
in Las Vegas”).
253 Schultz, supra note 252. 
254 See the beginning of supra Part III. 
255 As two examples, see supra notes 138–63 and accompanying text (regarding Laws) and supra 
notes 176–95 and accompanying text (regarding Polydoros). 
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For instance, one justification offered for the right of publicity is what 
can be called the market-information/consumer-protection theory—that the 
right of publicity helps markets function by giving consumers useful 
information about products.256 As one court invoked the concept, 
“[a]ssociating one’s goodwill with a product transmits valuable information 
to consumers.”257 This market-information story of the right of publicity is 
essentially the same economic narrative that undergirds trademark: A 
functioning, efficient market is abetted by dependable information about 
the sources of products.258 A consumer who sees a celebrity endorse a 
certain product may, according to theory, assume that the celebrity “would 
not associate himself, even for a fee, with a firm that provides inferior 
service.”259 
The market-information theory has been subjected to strong criticism 
in the right-of-publicity context.260 To the extent one accepts the theory on 
its own terms, however, it seems clear that it supplies support differentially 
to the endorsement right, the merchandizing entitlement, and the right 
against virtual impressment.  
The theory’s support for the endorsement-right prong of the right of 
publicity seems relatively strong: To the extent that personal identities can 
transmit information about products—at least outside of the existing 
trademark context that is already covered by trademark law—the 
recognition of an endorsement right seems a straightforward way to 
achieve this.261  
256 Douglas Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1187 n.7 (1978) (arguing that legally protected 
celebrity identities, when used in conjunction with products, “promote the flow of useful information 
about commercial goods and services to the public by ensuring that the public is not confused by a false 
implication that a particular celebrity has endorsed a particular good”). 
257 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994). 
258 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277 
(explaining that Congress enacted trademark law to “protect the public so that it may be confident that, 
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product 
which it asks for and which it wants to get” and to protect investments in commercial reputation). 
259 James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 
51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 645 (1973). 
260 For example, Michael Madow posits that instead of reasoning logically about what celebrity 
endorsement indicates about a product, celebrity endorsement may derive its impact by working at the 
level of a consumer’s emotion. See Madow, supra note 2, at 231. Further, Madow points out that if the 
right of publicity is justified by a trademark/consumer-deception theory, then it seems anomalous that 
the right of publicity can be used to enjoin truthful representations about the association of a given 
celebrity and a given product. Id. 
261 See Treece, supra note 259, at 644–45 (“Names and pictures of celebrities more effectively 
produce customer responses than those of noncelebrities, but images of unknown people also motivate 
decisions to purchase.”).  
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For the merchandising entitlement, however, the rationale of 
providing needed market information and consumer protection appears 
relatively weak, or even nonsensical: In the merchandizing context, a 
celebrity’s image on a product is not an indication of value; rather, the 
image is the source of value for that product.262  
And for a right against virtual impressment, the market-
information/consumer-protection theory appears non-applicable. When 
Elvis fans go to see an Elvis impersonator show, those fans are basing their 
decision entirely on the sort of entertainment they want to consume, not on 
a misapprehension that they are actually going to see Elvis. In such a case, 
the name “Elvis” does not provide information about the level of quality of 
the show; it provides nominative information about the subject matter of 
the live performance. 
Personal autonomy or autonomous self-definition is another 
theoretical justification that has been offered for the right of publicity, and 
it too seems to apply to the three rights quite differently. The autonomy-
centered idea is that the right of publicity provides a legal mechanism for 
people to control the image they project of themselves to the world by 
allowing them to choose what, if any, associations they will have with 
commercial ventures. This theory has been notably championed by Mark 
McKenna, who explains that “[t]he things and people with which 
individuals choose to associate reflect their character and values. An 
individual’s choices therefore can be viewed as the text of her identity, and 
unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in connection with products or 
services threaten to recreate that text.”263 
Insofar as autonomous self-definition is a compelling justification for 
law, it applies most strongly when it comes to unauthorized endorsements. 
In general, McKenna’s examples of factual situations that implicate 
autonomous self-definition interests are examples of unauthorized 
endorsements, such as a football player unwittingly made to appear in an 
advertisement for beer.264 Uses that suggest a person’s endorsement of 
262 The merchandizing entitlement, by its very nature, concerns objects whose value to the 
consumer derives principally from the fact that the objects carry the symbol, as opposed to deriving 
from the objects’ functional nature. See supra Section III.B. 
263 McKenna, supra note 2, at 229. 
264 Id. at 280–82 (additionally citing as examples a person’s picture used in a television ad for an 
erectile-dysfunction medication, a country singer’s appearance in a home-appliance commercial, and a 
radio disc jockey’s employment as a spokesperson for a fast-food restaurant). 
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goods or services can be said to impinge on a person’s right of autonomous 
self-definition because they force someone to speak on another’s behalf.265  
As a justification for the merchandizing entitlement, by contrast, 
autonomous self-definition is clearly not as strong. It is at least plausible 
that persons could argue that their sense of self is undermined when their 
image is appropriated to merchandise. On the other hand, merchandizing 
might be characterized as a merely “referential” use of a person’s identity, 
not a use that threatens to alter meaning and therefore impinge on a 
person’s right of self-definition.266 One can go even further and plausibly 
argue that personal autonomy tends to justify the rejection of a 
merchandizing-entitlement cause of action. When people wear or use 
merchandise bearing a celebrity name or likeness, they do so typically as a 
way of showing cultural identification with what that celebrity has come to 
represent.267 Thus, the free availability of celebrity merchandise, unfettered 
by exclusive legal claims, could be seen as abetting the autonomous self-
definition interests of merchandise purchasers.  
By contrast, a theory of personal autonomy or autonomous self-
definition seems plausibly strong in the virtual-impressment context, 
because to employ an entertainer in a capacity not reflecting that 
entertainer’s vision of self could be said to infringe upon that entertainer’s 
right to self-define. Suppose Jane Smith is a singer/songwriter who has 
made a decision, based on newfound religious convictions, to no longer 
perform the hit song that once made her famous, one which she now 
regards as blasphemous. An impersonator giving a live performance of that 
song might be regarded as interfering with Jane’s decision to disavow her 
own song.268  
These example, above, are meant to be just a sampling of how the 
three-rights view of the right of publicity might help advance and sharpen 
265 Id. at 286 (stating, for example, that “an individual should be able to prevent uses that suggest 
her sponsorship or endorsement” on the basis that implied endorsement is essentially forcing someone 
to speak on behalf of another and carry their message).  
266 See id. at 291 (discussing the limitations of an autonomy-based right-of-publicity action, and 
noting that “[s]ince celebrity personas are packed with a rich set of connotations that are understood 
widely, they play a crucial role in the genesis and transmission of culture. Some uses then may simply 
draw on the cultural meaning of their time in order to communicate, without risk of redefining that 
meaning” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). 
267 See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing various examples, including the use of the 
image of Judy Garland in the 1950s as “a powerful means” for gay men “of speaking to each other 
about themselves”). 
268 See Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2005) (“Compelling a person to express a message 
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief. It threatens her ability to control what 
she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important. . . .”). 
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the debate about theoretical justifications for the right of publicity. 
Moreover, the above examples help to highlight, as a descriptive doctrinal 
matter, the very real conceptual distinctions among the endorsement right, 
the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual impressment. 
B. Precision in Judicial or Legislative Adoption
The right of publicity has, over the decades, grown in recognition 
among jurisdictions, and courts and legislatures will continue to face 
choices of whether to create additional legal recognition for the right of 
publicity. In making these decisions, the doctrinal architecture I have 
suggested in this Article may help lawmakers and judges in understanding 
the choices available to them. That is, the three-rights view of the right of 
publicity can provide courts and legislatures with a menu to use when 
making new law.  
Specifically, viewing the right of publicity as three separate rights, 
each one associated with a distinct cause of action, invites jurisdictions to 
adopt one or two of the causes of action without adopting them all. This 
capacity should facilitate more purposeful development of the law across 
jurisdictions. 
Prosser’s ramification of the right of privacy into four separate rights 
and associated causes of action provided a similar opportunity to courts.269 
For instance, Florida courts have declined to recognize the existence of the 
false light tort.270 Yet Florida courts have recognized a cause of action for 
public disclosure of private facts.271 With a subdivided right of publicity, 
jurisdictions can take advantage of additional opportunities for choosiness. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its birth a little over sixty years ago, the right of publicity has 
lacked a solid articulation. To be sure, courts have recited a pat blackletter 
statement of the right, but the reality has always been at odds with this 
formulation. This broken aspect of the law, inconvenient as it is, has long 
been ignored by the bench, the bar, and the academy. But as this Article has 
shown, it is productive to think carefully about the difference between what 
is said and what is done in the right-of-publicity context, because the 
disconnect seems to lie at the root of the right of publicity’s most urgent 
problems. 
269 Regarding Prosser’s four-way division of the right of privacy, see supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
270 See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) (declining to recognize false 
light as a cause of action on the grounds that it offers little over defamation). 
271 See Doe v. Univision Television Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
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Lacking a means of talking about what the right of publicity is, courts 
have concentrated on what the right of publicity is not. Norms of 
constitutional avoidance have fallen by the wayside as courts have used the 
First Amendment to burn away the right of publicity’s sprawling excesses 
in case after case. When the First Amendment would not work, courts have 
engaged in improbable and even incoherent copyright-preemption analysis, 
or else have ignored facts, logic, and precedent in ways that can be 
described as judge nullification.  
This Article has sought to supply the missing blackletter explanation 
for what the right of publicity is. The trick to making sense of the right of 
publicity is to understand that rather than being one right and one cause of 
action, it is in reality three separate rights cognizable with three distinct 
actions. This Article has delineated those rights as the endorsement right, 
the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual impressment.  
As things stand today, the right of publicity needs help. Practitioners 
perceive rampant unpredictability in the resolution of publicity-rights 
disputes.272 Judicial opinions reveal the courts’ enduring befuddlement in 
applying the law.273 And scholars see deep theoretical unsoundness.274 My 
hope is that the analysis offered in the Article will be productively 
disruptive on all fronts, thus enabling real progress with what has been one 
of the most persistently vexing areas of modern intellectual property law. 
272 See supra note 4. 
273 See discussion in supra Section II.D. 
274 See supra note 2. 
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